Focus: Block, Blunt, Break: NATO Unveils Its Plan to Stop a Russian Invasion

NATO’s top commander has publicly set out how the Alliance would defeat a Russian attack. Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12 October, General Alexus Grynkewich, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, described a “theory of victory” built on three strategies designed to halt an invasion: block, blunt and break. Under the plan, Allied forces would block an attack at the border, blunt it by striking advancing troops from air, sea and land, and finally break the enemy by targeting its supply chains and command networks. The doctrine draws directly on Ukraine’s battlefield. It relies on precision weapons with “affordable mass”, such as drones and other autonomous systems, and aims to stop an attack rather than seize enemy territory. Grynkewich stressed that NATO does not consider war with Russia imminent or inevitable, but intends to be ready for one.

The timing was deliberate. On 1 October, Putin warned that Russia would consider using the full range of its arsenal, including nuclear weapons, if Kaliningrad were threatened, after NATO drills near the exclave that the Alliance described as defensive. The same day, Secretary General Mark Rutte, speaking in Germany alongside Chancellor Merz and Dutch Prime Minister Jetten, told Europe to prepare for a world in which Russian sabotage, arson and hybrid attacks are a regular occurrence. National intelligence services echoed the alarm. Germany’s foreign intelligence chief warned that Moscow increasingly sees Berlin as a principal adversary, Poland blamed Russian intelligence for an arson attack on a Starlink station, and Norway’s security service called the situation Europe’s most serious since the Second World War.

The plan’s credibility, however, rests on Alliance unity, and that unity is under visible strain. Washington invited Putin to December’s G20 summit in Miami, a move seen as potentially ending Moscow’s diplomatic isolation, and Trump then announced a deal temporarily easing sanctions on Russian diesel exports. In response, EU foreign ministers insisted European sanctions would stay in place, and Zelenskyy called the diesel agreement unfair. Moscow appears to be counting on these divisions. A former Russian deputy foreign minister claimed that many experts advising the Kremlin are convinced NATO would not respond forcefully to a strike on the UK. 

The first half of October therefore exposed a widening gap between NATO’s military planning and its political cohesion. The Alliance’s military commanders now have a coherent, Ukraine-tested doctrine for defending Europe. But deterrence depends as much on Moscow believing that 32 capitals would act together as on battle plans. As Europe moves to simplify defence procurement and fund rapid innovation through new EU legislation adopted on 9 and 12 October, the test ahead is whether that political cohesion can keep pace with NATO’s military planning.

External Military Operations & Cooperations

NATO command post exercise tests plans for defending the eastern flank

From 6 to 15 October 2026, US Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) and NATO’s Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) held Avenger Triad 26, a command post exercise simulating large-scale combat across land, air, sea, cyber and space. About 2,000 US and 2,000 allied personnel worked from command posts in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland. The exercise was linked to NATO’s Steadfast Duel 26 which connected decision-makers in all 32 allies. USAREUR-AF and LANDCOM worked as one integrated headquarters from Clay Kaserne in Wiesbaden. Lieutenant General Jez Bennett, acting commander of LANDCOM, said the exercise showed collective defence to be “an active, trained reality”. The main aim was to put NATO’s Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative into practice. The initiative combines sensors, drones, cloud computing and shared data to shorten the time between detecting a threat and striking it. Headquarters used the US-developed Maven Smart System to build one common picture across the dispersed national command posts. Brigadier General Thomas Lowin of LANDCOM said allies have proved they “can connect distributed sensors to effectors” but stressed that warfare “remains fundamentally human”. In his account, the software proposes options and the commander still decides.

The lessons will be used to prepare for Steadfast Defender 2027 (NATO’s large field exercise) where the same concepts are to be tested with troops on the ground. 

International relations

SACEUR sets out a “theory of victory” against Russia

At the Warsaw Security Forum on 12 October 2026, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe US General Alexus Grynkewich described how the alliance would answer an attack on its territory as governments weigh warnings that Russia could be able to strike a member by 2030. His formula is to “block, blunt and break” any aggression. NATO would first stop an assault with land forces backed by air, naval, cyber and space assets, targeting the attacking troops and denying them territory. It would then wear down the advancing force with sensors and autonomous systems, and, if the attack did not stop, destroy the enemy’s warfighting system and everything supporting it with precision munitions and unmanned systems, including targets deep behind the front. Grynkewich said he did not judge conflict imminent or inevitable but that any attack on an ally would “prove utterly futile.”

Grynkewich also answered Moscow’s recent letter threatening nuclear use if NATO moved against Kaliningrad by saying escalation would not fracture the alliance and that NATO could match any adversary up the escalation ladder.

Camille Grand, NATO’s former assistant secretary-general for defence investment, read the underlying blueprint as a deliberate signal that NATO would fight with or without large-scale American involvement and that it was ready to threaten Russia’s war machine far behind the front line.

Ultimately, the credibility of such a plan rests on the forces, infrastructure and coordination to carry it out, which is the gap European members are now under pressure to close.

Industry updates

Sweden launches an uncrewed underwater drone for seabed surveillance

Saab, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) and the Swedish armed forces have launched a demonstrator for a Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (LUUV) less than a year after FMV ordered it under a SEK 60m (€5.4m) contract signed in August 2025. The vehicle has moved from concept through sea trials, completing the project’s first phase.

FMV compares the LUUV to a small submarine, able to monitor large areas on its own for long periods with or without a crew. It carries no weapons in this phase. Its task is surveillance consisting of watching seabed infrastructure and detecting underwater threats which has become a priority for Nordic states since the sabotage of Baltic pipelines and cables in recent years. The next phase will develop more advanced capabilities and feed into Swedish decisions on acquiring autonomous underwater systems.

The European Defence Fund attracts a record number of proposals for its 2026 calls

The European Defence Fund received 612 project proposals under its 2026 calls for collaborative defence research and development, the highest number since the Fund began operating in 2021. The applicants are competing for €1.006bn. For the first time, Ukrainian entities could apply since Ukraine’s association to the Fund is expected to enter into force shortly.

Half of the budget is reserved for large capability projects, many of them meant to carry results from earlier EDF rounds towards prototypes that could be produced and bought. The topics include a European interceptor against missiles inside the atmosphere, a next-generation main battle tank, a multiple rocket launcher and a semi-autonomous naval vessel. Further calls target emerging fields such as quantum-secured communications, electronic warfare, a cloud for multi-domain operations and high-performance energy systems.

A quarter of the money goes to the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS) with about €60m for disruptive technologies and €60m in open calls for small and medium-sized enterprises. The SME calls drew particularly strong demand which the Commission attributes to the simpler application procedure introduced by the defence mini-omnibus adopted in December 2025. 

The figures show how far the defence-industrial base now looks to Brussels for funding. Demand on this scale also means that most applicants will leave empty-handed since €1bn spread across 612 proposals can fund only a fraction of them, and the Fund’s whole envelope for 2021–2027 amounts to just under €7.3bn.

Other news

Lithuania willing to pay for a permanent US base

Lithuania is prepared to cover the cost of a permanent US military base on its territory. Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius wrote on Facebook on 6 October 2026 that the country’s partners only needed to take “a political decision” on permanently stationing troops and that Lithuania would pay the associated costs. US President Donald Trump said Washington would “certainly” consider the offer, calling Lithuanians “great people”. The proposal builds on an existing presence. US forces have rotated continuously through the Pabradė Training Area near the Belarusian border since 2019 and the US Army counted more than 1,000 American troops operating and training in the country in 2025. A new temporary rotation is due to arrive soon. Offering to pay for a base turns a political commitment into a deal which may make a permanent US presence easier to secure at a time when Washington is reducing its troops in Europe. However, it also binds Lithuania’s security more tightly to American decisions and American suppliers while the EU encourages its member states to buy more European.