{"id":1904,"date":"2026-02-01T18:28:24","date_gmt":"2026-02-01T17:28:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/?p=1904"},"modified":"2026-02-01T18:28:25","modified_gmt":"2026-02-01T17:28:25","slug":"newsfeed-january-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/2026\/02\/01\/newsfeed-january-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"NewsFeed &#8211; January 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>The NewsFeed is a press review with a summary of a selection of articles and events that occurred in the past weeks. Keep track!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"Focus\"><strong>Focus: Greenland Threats Highlight Need for Greater European Defence Autonomy<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Recent U.S. posturing over Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, has once again exposed Europe\u2019s enduring strategic vulnerabilities in the Arctic and beyond. As Washington, Moscow, and Beijing intensify competition over Arctic sea lanes, critical infrastructure, and mineral wealth, European capitals find themselves reacting rather than shaping events. Greenland has become a stark reminder that Europe still lacks an autonomous and fully credible security architecture capable of addressing evolving threats in a timely and robust manner. Continued dependence on the U.S. military\u2011industrial complex and U.S. intelligence assets risks compounding Europe\u2019s insecurity and, ultimately, undermining EU member states\u2019 sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This dilemma is not new. During the Cold War, the United States maintained extensive military facilities in Greenland to monitor Soviet activity, while European states largely relied on American early\u2011warning systems and strategic guarantees. Decades later, despite the establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Europe has yet to translate political ambition into integrated, deployable forces able to project power in strategically vital regions. Fragmented defence planning, divergent threat perceptions, and slow political coordination have repeatedly stalled progress toward strategic autonomy, leaving Europe dependent on allies to guarantee its security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Europe\u2019s slow adaptation is particularly striking given that war has raged on the continent\u2019s periphery, and now within it, for more than a decade. Even four years after Russia\u2019s full\u2011scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union continues to struggle with rapid response, readiness, and joint operational capability. Greenland illustrates how even pressure from a NATO ally can trigger alarm, while simultaneously exposing gaps in Europe\u2019s ability to act independently. As French President Emmanuel Macron remarked at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Europe may be \u201cslow\u201d and in need of reform, but it is also predictable, loyal, and governed by the rule of law, qualities that now demand faster, more integrated decision\u2011making to remain credible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For years, competing and often mutually exclusive strategic paradigms within Europe paralysed meaningful progress. A large camp, most notably the United Kingdom and several Eastern European states, feared that pursuing defence autonomy would duplicate NATO structures or antagonise the United States, long viewed as the ultimate guarantor of European security. Others, such as France, or countries that were historically outside NATO, like Finland and Sweden, for much of the post\u2011Cold War period, operated under different threat models and strategic cultures. These divisions delayed consensus on whether European defence autonomy was desirable, let alone urgent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Recent developments surrounding Greenland may finally be breaking this gridlock. Despite the extensive rights granted to the United States under the 1951 defence agreement with Denmark, former U.S. President Donald Trump openly suggested the use of military and economic pressure to take control of the territory. Although his rhetoric was later softened and the use of force ruled out, the episode publicly demonstrated that even close allies cannot be assumed to be permanently aligned. It underscored a broader reality: Europe &#8211; and, indeed, all U.S.-allied states &#8211; must be capable of wielding sufficient power to deter rivals and protect their interests autonomously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Europe\u2019s economic weight provides a theoretical deterrent, but its deployment carries high costs and risks of self\u2011harm, limiting its credibility in acute security crises. By contrast, the presence of a small international tripwire force in Greenland, combined with clear Danish communication that any incursion would be met with armed resistance, highlighted the enduring importance of credible military deterrence. Against the backdrop of both Russian aggression and increasingly unpredictable signals from Washington, European rhetoric is beginning to shift. Figures such as EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius have openly discussed the need for a unified European force of up to 100,000 troops, an idea that would have been politically unthinkable only a few years ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Greenland, then, is more than a territorial dispute or Arctic flashpoint. It is a case study in Europe\u2019s persistent strategic weaknesses and a warning about the costs of continued reliance on external guarantors. While initiatives such as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen\u2019s Arctic security package are steps in the right direction, they remain insufficient so long as Europe depends overwhelmingly on U.S. military assets for deterrence and crisis response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To safeguard sovereignty, enhance its capacity to project power, and credibly deter future threats, the European Union must accelerate defence integration, develop joint capabilities, and establish rapid deployment mechanisms that can operate independently when required. Without decisive action, Europe risks remaining reactive, reliant, and ill\u2011prepared for an increasingly turbulent strategic environment. The Greenland episode makes clear that the time for deeper European defence integration is no longer theoretical &#8211; it is urgent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"External-Operations\"><strong>External Military Operations &amp; Cooperations\u00a0<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><strong>Romania Prepares to Deploy Merops as Part of NATO\u2019s Eastern Air Defence Posture<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Romanian Armed Forces are preparing to induct the Merops anti-drone system into active service, marking a concrete step in strengthening national and allied air defence against low-cost, long-range unmanned threats. According to Romania\u2019s Chief of the Defence Staff, General Gheorghi\u021b\u0103 Vlad, trained operator teams are already in place, and the system is expected to be integrated shortly into Romania\u2019s ongoing airspace defence operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Merops has drawn attention within NATO following reported operational success in Ukraine, where it has allegedly achieved over 1.000 interceptions of Shahed-type drones. The system is also undergoing testing by Polish forces as part of a broader NATO effort to reinforce the alliance\u2019s eastern flank. Romanian media report that Merops has proven effective during trials against Shahed replicas, reinforcing confidence in its counter-UAS performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Developed by US startup Project Eagle, founded by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt after Russia\u2019s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Merops combines a ground control station, a truck-mounted launcher, and the Surveyor interceptor drone. The AI-enabled interceptor can reach speeds of up to 282 km\/h and neutralise targets via collision or proximity detonation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With an estimated unit cost of around $15.000 &#8211; significantly lower than the price of a Shahed &#8211; Merops offers a cost-effective, attritable solution to mass drone attacks, operated by a small crew trained in a matter of weeks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The induction of Merops should be read primarily through a NATO operational lens rather than an industrial one. Within the Alliance, prioritising a system that has already demonstrated effectiveness in Ukraine and can be fielded rapidly is a rational choice, even if it originates from a US company. Speed, attrition economics, and interoperability matter more than industrial symbolism when the threat is immediate and persistent. That said, the deployment sits uneasily alongside the EU\u2019s stated \u201cEurope first\u201d defence-industrial ambition. It reinforces a familiar tension: while European frameworks emphasise strategic autonomy, operational decisions at the eastern flank continue to default to US-backed solutions that are mature, combat-tested, and quickly deployable. Merops therefore illustrates not a contradiction of European defence policy, but its current limits\u2014where urgency still outweighs industrial consolidation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"International-relations\"><strong>International Relations<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Sweden Accelerates Defence Spending\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Sweden is accelerating its defence spending amid a rapidly deteriorating security environment, driven by heightened tensions to both its east and west. The government plans to allocate an additional 19bn Swedish kronor toward strengthening military capabilities, with a particular focus on air and missile defence, unmanned systems, and force readiness. Swedish officials have described the current geopolitical outlook as the most serious in decades, citing Russia\u2019s continued military assertiveness and growing instability across Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The increase builds on Sweden\u2019s broader rearmament trajectory following its accession to NATO, with defence spending projected to reach around 2.8% of GDP in 2026. The move underscores a wider European shift toward sustained military investment, as frontline and newly allied states adapt their defence postures to a more volatile and unpredictable strategic environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Germany &amp; Israel Sign Major Security Cooperation Agreement\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed a major security cooperation agreement with Germany, emphasising the long\u2011standing partnership between the two nations and their shared strategic interests. The pact, formalised in Jerusalem with Germany\u2019s Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, focuses on deepening collaboration in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and protection against drone and digital threats, highlighting a mutual commitment to safeguarding critical infrastructure in an era of evolving security challenges. Netanyahu described Germany and Israel as \u201cnatural partners\u201d in defence and technology cooperation, underscoring the significance of expanding bilateral ties in response to emerging global risks.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The agreement also reflects a broader shift in Germany\u2019s engagement with Israeli security priorities, building on existing defence cooperation such as joint work on missile defence systems and growing cyber defence coordination. Both governments view the enhanced partnership as vital for addressing sophisticated threats and strengthening resilience across multiple domains, from digital networks to counter\u2011terrorism. Beyond technical cooperation, the pact symbolises deepening political and security ties between Berlin and Jerusalem amid a complex regional environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>NATO\u2019s Rutte Warns Europe Cannot Replace US Security Umbrella Alone<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In a stark assessment of Europe\u2019s defence prospects, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte cautioned that the continent cannot realistically build credible defence capacity without the continued support of the United States. Speaking to European policymakers, Rutte argued that efforts to imagine a fully autonomous European defence, including proposals for large standing forces or independent nuclear deterrence, are unrealistic under current resource and capability constraints. He emphasised that if Europe truly aims to \u201cgo it alone,\u201d defence spending would need to rise dramatically &#8211; far above current levels &#8211; and major capability gaps would have to be closed, especially in strategic areas like intelligence, logistics, surveillance and nuclear deterrence.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Rutte\u2019s comments reflect growing debate in European capitals over the future of NATO and the extent of strategic autonomy following repeated U.S. political pressures and shifts in Washington\u2019s defence posture. While EU and NATO members have increased their military budgets and explored more integrated cooperation, analysts say fully replacing U.S. military contributions, from heavy airlift to nuclear capabilities, would demand massive investment and years of coordination. The warning underscores that deepening European defence cooperation remains a long\u2011term project, even as alliances adapt to changing transatlantic dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>UK and EU to Resume Talks on Access to EU Defence Fund<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The United Kingdom and the European Union have agreed to restart negotiations over Britain\u2019s potential participation in the EU\u2019s multibillion\u2011euro defence funding programme, a move reflecting both sides\u2019 interest in deeper military cooperation despite broader political tensions. London and Brussels will begin a new round of discussions in the coming weeks aimed at resolving disagreements over terms and access rights that have stalled progress since the UK\u2019s departure from the bloc. The talks come against a backdrop of shifting security dynamics in Europe, as member states and partners alike seek to strengthen collective defence industrial capability and interoperability.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The EU\u2019s defence fund \u2014 formally known as the European Defence Fund (EDF) \u2014 supports collaborative research and capability development across the bloc, with a focus on joint weapons systems, cyber capabilities, and strategic technology projects. UK interest in joining the programme underscores the continuing importance of European multilateral defence initiatives even after Brexit, and highlights the recognition in both capitals that enhanced cooperation could yield mutual security and industrial benefits. The renewed dialogue also mirrors broader efforts to bridge divisions over defence cooperation and align strategic priorities amid evolving geopolitical pressures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"industry-updates\">Industry updates<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Dassault Aviation Leads Investment Into Autonomous Drone &amp; AI Startup Harmattan AI<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>French aerospace firm Dassault Aviation is leading a \u20ac200mn Series B funding round in autonomous drone and AI startup Harmattan AI, valuing the company at approximately \u20ac1.4bn, France\u2019s newest defence \u201cunicorn.\u201d The investment forms part of a strategic partnership aimed at accelerating the integration of controlled autonomy and artificial intelligence into future combat aviation systems, including unmanned aerial systems and next-generation air combat platforms. Harmattan AI, founded in 2024, has already won programs with the French and U.K. defence ministries, highlighting rapid traction for its autonomous ISR, drone interception, and electronic-warfare capabilities.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The collaboration goes beyond financing: Dassault and Harmattan plan to embed advanced AI into platforms such as future Rafale variants and cooperative unmanned systems to enhance combat effectiveness and sovereign technology development. Proceeds from the funding will help Harmattan scale production, expand its product offerings into new operational domains, and support global deployment amid growing demand for AI-enabled defence technologies. The deal underscores the shift in European defence towards autonomous and AI-driven capabilities as part of broader modernisation efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Ukraine Holds Off on More Drone Orders from Helsing\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ukraine has decided to hold off on additional purchases of strike drones from European startup Helsing after frontline testing revealed technical challenges with the HX\u20112 model, designed for long-range precision strikes. The drones, equipped with AI-assisted autonomous guidance and advanced target acquisition systems, reportedly faced takeoff failures, reliability issues, and software malfunctions during initial combat deployments. These problems have led Kyiv to delay follow-on orders while assessing operational performance and exploring potential modifications. The pause affects a German-funded contract, which had supported the production and delivery of several units for immediate frontline use.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The decision reflects the intense pressure on drone manufacturers to rapidly iterate and deploy systems in high-stakes battlefield conditions. Internal assessments suggest that electronic warfare and environmental factors near the frontlines may have contributed to the HX\u20112\u2019s challenges. While Helsing maintains that several units are still operational and that interest from Ukrainian forces continues, the setback highlights the difficulties of introducing cutting-edge autonomous weapons into ongoing conflicts. Analysts say Ukraine\u2019s careful approach underscores the balance between accelerating technology adoption and ensuring operational reliability, particularly as drones play an increasingly central role in modern warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Rheinmetall and OHB in Talks for Starlink-Style Service for German Army\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>German arms maker Rheinmetall and satellite manufacturer OHB are in early discussions about a potential joint venture to build a secure satellite communications network for the German armed forces, akin to Elon Musk\u2019s Starlink constellation. The initiative aims to tap into Germany\u2019s \u20ac35bn military space budget, part of Berlin\u2019s broader effort to strengthen sovereign defence infrastructure and reduce dependence on U.S. systems. The proposed system would offer low Earth orbit (LEO) connectivity tailored to Bundeswehr needs, improving battlefield communications and resilience, especially across NATO\u2019s eastern flank, where Germany has significantly increased its presence.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>OHB, Europe\u2019s third\u2011largest satellite maker, saw its share price jump sharply on the news, reflecting investor optimism about winning a major national defence contract. For Rheinmetall, traditionally focused on land\u2011based systems, space represents a strategic diversification into high\u2011growth defence tech. The talks come as European firms compete for lucrative space and military space programmes, with rivals like Airbus, Thales and Leonardo also positioning to win related work. A formal tender process is expected as Germany prepares specifications for the network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"european-policies\">European Policies<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>EU Approves First Two SAFE Batches to Kickstart Major Defence Funding<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The European Commission has approved the first two \u201cbatches\u201d of national defence investment plans under the EU\u2019s new \u20ac150bn Security Action for Europe (SAFE) programme, marking a significant step in strengthening European defence industrial capacity and military readiness. SAFE, part of the wider Readiness 2030 initiative, was created to provide long\u2011term, low\u2011cost loans to EU countries for joint procurement of critical defence equipment such as ammunition, air and missile systems, drones, and infrastructure. The instrument is designed to help close capability gaps exposed by the war in Ukraine and rising geopolitical tensions.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On 15 January 2026, the Commission endorsed the first batch of plans from Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Portugal and Romania, opening the way for an initial \u20ac38bn in potential loans once the Council adopts implementing decisions &#8211; expected in early 2026. The European Council now has four weeks to finalise approvals, with first payments anticipated around March 2026.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Less than two weeks later, on 26 January, the Commission approved a second batch of SAFE plans from eight additional member states &#8211; Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Finland &#8211; together representing tens of billions more in planned defence investment under the scheme. These successive approvals signal accelerating implementation of SAFE and a growing commitment by EU capitals to modernise forces and foster defence\u2011industrial cooperation.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The progression of SAFE approvals underscores a shift in European policy toward pooled procurement and shared financial mechanisms for defence, with the goal of improving interoperability and ensuring timely delivery of key capabilities across the bloc. EU officials have emphasised that SAFE is a cornerstone of European strategic autonomy, intended to boost defence industry output and enable member states to respond more effectively to security challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The European Commission has Today Proposed a New Cybersecurity Package<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On 20 January 2026, the European Commission presented a new cybersecurity package aimed at strengthening the EU\u2019s resilience and capabilities against growing hybrid and cyber threats targeting critical services, infrastructure and democratic institutions. The initiative is a response to the increasing frequency and sophistication of attacks by state and criminal actors.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The core of the package is a revised EU cybersecurity regulation designed to improve the security of information and communication technology (ICT) supply chains. It proposes a harmonised, risk-based approach to reduce vulnerabilities associated with external suppliers, including third-country dependencies that pose strategic risks to the functioning of essential services across the EU\u2019s 18 critical sectors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The revision also modernises the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ECCF) to create clearer, faster and more transparent certification procedures. These changes are intended to make it easier for products and services circulating in the internal market to be tested and certified for cybersecurity compliance, lowering barriers for companies while increasing trust and security for end users.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The package includes measures to simplify compliance with existing EU cybersecurity rules, streamline incident reporting, and clarify legal obligations \u2014 including targeted updates to the NIS 2 Directive that affect nearly 30,000 businesses, from micro enterprises to larger midcap firms.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Expanded mandates for the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (Enisa) are central to implementation. Enisa will coordinate early warnings, support response to ransomware incidents in cooperation with Europol and other teams, manage incident reporting tools, and help build cybersecurity skills across the EU.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Once approved by the European Parliament and Council, the regulation will apply immediately. Member states will have one year to adopt related directive changes into national law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>EU\u2019s \u20ac430bn Crisis Fund Could Be Repurposed to Support Defence Spending<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The head of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has suggested that the euro zone\u2019s \u20ac430bn crisis fund, originally established to support financially troubled economies, could be used to lend money to countries for defence expenditures amid rising geopolitical tensions in Europe. Pierre Gramegna, managing director of the ESM, said the fund could offer low\u2011interest credit lines for defence without strict economic reform conditions, aiming to avoid the stigma associated with traditional bailouts while helping states with stretched budgets meet rising military costs.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Under the proposal, financially stable euro\u2011area members could borrow up to around 2\u202f% of GDP for defence purchases, echoing similar support mechanisms used in the pandemic. The idea has particular appeal for smaller states with high defence spending pressures, such as the Baltic countries, though approval from all euro\u2011zone members would be required, including neutral countries like Austria and Ireland. Any shift in the ESM\u2019s mission toward defence would mark a significant repurposing of its crisis\u2011response mandate, reflecting broader European efforts to mobilise financial tools for strategic security needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Slovenia Takes Over Leadership of Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) Initiative&nbsp;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Slovenia has taken over the one-year presidency of the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) initiative as of January 1, 2026, succeeding Slovakia and bringing leadership to this regional defence cooperation framework that includes Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, with Poland attending as an observer. Under the slogan <em>\u201cFrom Policy to Practice &#8211; Building a Stronger Central Europe,\u201d<\/em> Slovenia will coordinate collaborative defence efforts aimed at enhancing interoperability, cyber resilience, and cooperation with Western Balkan partners, while aligning with broader EU and NATO security objectives.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>During its presidency, Ljubljana plans to prioritise strengthening regional security cooperation, exchanging best practices, improving operational readiness, and advancing joint capabilities among member states. The rotating CEDC chairmanship facilitates joint ministerial meetings and expert dialogues to address shared challenges and deepen defence integration within Central Europe,&nbsp; a focus that reflects growing interest among member states in collaborative regional security efforts amid an increasingly complex strategic environment.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Macron Signals Tougher Line on France\u2019s Defence Industry, Open to European Suppliers<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>French President Emmanuel Macron warned the domestic defence sector that Paris may look beyond its traditional homegrown suppliers if they can\u2019t deliver at the speed and efficiency needed to meet France\u2019s rapidly evolving military requirements. Speaking to French forces at Istres Air Base in southern France, Macron emphasised that in a world of intensifying global threats, the French Armed Forces must be equipped quickly and effectively, and that European alternatives could be considered if local firms fall behind. The comments signal a potential shift in France\u2019s long\u2011standing preference for primarily procuring from domestic giants such as Thales, Safran and Airbus, which together account for the bulk of France\u2019s defence contracts.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Macron framed the remarks as part of a broader effort to accelerate France\u2019s rearmament and strengthen collective European defence industrial capabilities. He reiterated France\u2019s plan to bring its defence budget to \u20ac64bn by 2027, three years ahead of schedule, and stressed priorities such as expanding ammunition stockpiles, air and space defences, and improving military readiness. Macron\u2019s message was clear: French defence manufacturers need to adapt, innovate and accelerate, or risk seeing Paris turn to European partners who can meet operational demands more swiftly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>EU Defence Commissioner Proposes 100,000\u2011Strong Standing Force<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>European Union Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius is pushing for a fundamental rethink of the bloc\u2019s defence architecture, arguing that Europe must move beyond fragmented national forces if it is to meet the security challenges of the coming decade. Speaking at a security conference in Sweden, Kubilius revived a long\u2011debated proposal to create a standing European military force of around 100,000 troops, designed not just to complement NATO but to give the EU credible independent capacity to respond to crises, especially if U.S. strategic commitments become less predictable. He described Europe\u2019s current setup as a collection of \u201cbonsai armies\u201d that lack the scale and integration needed for modern defence.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Kubilius framed the idea as part of a broader overhaul of how defence decisions are made in the EU, including the creation of a European Security Council to expedite strategic decision\u2011making and political coordination. His proposal also emphasises three pillars of defence readiness: deeper investment in industrial and production capacity, more coherent institutional structures, and stronger political will to deter or, if necessary, fight. The concept revives themes previously floated by figures such as Jean\u2011Claude Juncker, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, and reflects wider debates within the EU about strategic autonomy amid Russian aggression and shifting transatlantic dynamics.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Political and strategic pushback is already emerging: NATO leadership has warned that a standalone European army could duplicate alliance capabilities and weaken collective defence unless it is carefully integrated with NATO frameworks.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"other-topics\">Other topics<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>France Gives Greenlight to PANG<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At the end of December 2025, France formally upheld the construction of a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, marking a significant step in the renewal of its blue-water naval capabilities. The new aircraft programme, named Porte-Avions Nouvelle G\u00e9n\u00e9ration (PA-NG), will start to replace the French Navy&#8217;s only existing aircraft, Charles de Gaulle, in 2038 and ensure that French power projection capabilities at long range are secured for the latter half of this century and beyond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>From a strategic perspective, the President of France Emmanuel Macron, justified their decision to acquire this vessel by underlining their need to safeguard freedom of movement in a progressively disputed international landscape. This approval follows several years of technical and financial studies based on several military programming bills launched successively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Estimated at a value of approximately \u20ac10-11bn,, the PA-NG initiative could be considered one of the largest defence efforts in Europe. While the military dimension of the initiative is particularly relevant, the 10-year undertaking also has an important economic dimension. Indeed, around 800 companies are due to take part in the realisation of the initiative, the vast majority of which are small and medium enterprises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With respect to the last vessel of the previous generation of carriers, the PA-NG will be significantly larger, measuring in at around 78.000 tonnes in weight and approximately 310 metres in length. Another key aspect will be the use of nuclear reactors to power the vessel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Generally, construction of the ship is expected to start in the early 2030s, with sea trials expected in the mid-2030s. When it enters service, it will become the largest warship ever constructed in Europe, reinforcing France&#8217;s unique status in the European region as the only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, as well as its aspirations to remain a significant force at sea around the globe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Can Europe Speak with One Voice on Security? Lessons from Venezuela<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In early January 2026, a U.S. military operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro triggered a sharp, uneven response across Europe. Washington defended the raid as a law-enforcement action against drug trafficking and corruption; critics, including many governments, framed it as a breach of international law and state sovereignty.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-post-title\">NewsFeed &#8211; January 2026<\/h2>\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/speech_26_69\">https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/speech_26_69<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/uk-germany-discuss-nato-forces-greenland-calm-us-threat-bloomberg-news-reports-2026-01-11\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/uk-germany-discuss-nato-forces-greenland-calm-us-threat-bloomberg-news-reports-2026-01-11<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/eu-commission-working-package-support-arctic-security-von-der-leyen-says-2026-01-20\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/eu-commission-working-package-support-arctic-security-von-der-leyen-says-2026-01-20<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bruegel.org\/policy-brief\/europes-dependence-us-foreign-military-sales-and-what-do-about-it\">https:\/\/www.bruegel.org\/policy-brief\/europes-dependence-us-foreign-military-sales-and-what-do-about-it<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/history-and-timeline-csdp_en\">https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/history-and-timeline-csdp_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/stories\/2026\/01\/davos-2026-special-address-by-emmanuel-macron-president-of-france\">https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/stories\/2026\/01\/davos-2026-special-address-by-emmanuel-macron-president-of-france<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/88D298DF15E21833F86238369C92A497\/S2057563725100345a.pdf\/strategic_autonomy_a_quantum_leap_forward_on_european_total_defence.pdf\">https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/services\/aop-cambridge-core\/content\/view\/88D298DF15E21833F86238369C92A497\/S2057563725100345a.pdf\/strategic_autonomy_a_quantum_leap_forward_on_european_total_defence.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/20th_century\/den001.asp\">https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/20th_century\/den001.asp<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/my-europe\/2026\/01\/18\/what-is-the-eus-anti-coercion-instrument-and-how-does-it-work\">https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/my-europe\/2026\/01\/18\/what-is-the-eus-anti-coercion-instrument-and-how-does-it-work<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/2026\/01\/08\/danish-soldiers-would-shoot-back-if-invaded-government-confirms\">https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/2026\/01\/08\/danish-soldiers-would-shoot-back-if-invaded-government-confirms<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-needs-100000-strong-army-defense-commissioner-andrius-kubilius-military-overhaul\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-needs-100000-strong-army-defense-commissioner-andrius-kubilius-military-overhaul<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/thedefensepost.com\/2026\/01\/23\/romania-counter-drone-system\">https:\/\/thedefensepost.com\/2026\/01\/23\/romania-counter-drone-system<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.romania-insider.com\/us-anti-drone-system-merops-romania-jan-2026#:~:text=US%2Dmade%20anti%2Ddrone%20MEROPS,Defence%20Staff%2C%20general%20Gheorghi%C8%9B%C4%83%20Vlad.\">https:\/\/www.romania-insider.com\/us-anti-drone-system-merops-romania-jan-2026#:~:text=US%2Dmade%20anti%2Ddrone%20MEROPS,Defence%20Staff%2C%20general%20Gheorghi%C8%9B%C4%83%20Vlad.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2026-01-12\/sweden-lifts-defense-spend-as-outlook-darkens-in-east-and-west\">https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2026-01-12\/sweden-lifts-defense-spend-as-outlook-darkens-in-east-and-west<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-embed is-type-wp-embed is-provider-matzav-com wp-block-embed-matzav-com\"><div class=\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\">\n<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"gRAl0aLh3s\"><a href=\"https:\/\/matzav.com\/netanyahu-signs-major-security-pact-with-germany-natural-partners\/\">Netanyahu Signs Major Security Pact With Germany: &#8216;Natural Partners&#8217;<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe class=\"wp-embedded-content\" sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" style=\"position: absolute; clip: rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);\" title=\"&#8220;Netanyahu Signs Major Security Pact With Germany: &#8216;Natural Partners&#8217;&#8221; &#8212; Matzav.com\" src=\"https:\/\/matzav.com\/netanyahu-signs-major-security-pact-with-germany-natural-partners\/embed\/#?secret=oHxe89Ffzn#?secret=gRAl0aLh3s\" data-secret=\"gRAl0aLh3s\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\"><\/iframe>\n<\/div><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/e2f6cd48-2f89-4b75-9aae-fb9e70e773fd?shareType=nongift\">https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/e2f6cd48-2f89-4b75-9aae-fb9e70e773fd?shareType=nongift<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/2be694a4-cab6-4907-aa27-8c5d5169277b\">https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/2be694a4-cab6-4907-aa27-8c5d5169277b<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2026\/01\/12\/dassault-aviation-invests-in-harmattan-ai-at-14-billion-value\">https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2026\/01\/12\/dassault-aviation-invests-in-harmattan-ai-at-14-billion-value<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2026-01-19\/ukraine-holds-off-on-new-helsing-drone-orders-after-setbacks?sref=W7EBPDtW\">https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2026-01-19\/ukraine-holds-off-on-new-helsing-drone-orders-after-setbacks?sref=W7EBPDtW<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/3e81f272-a1d1-4424-8890-ccc7e364a6d3\">https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/3e81f272-a1d1-4424-8890-ccc7e364a6d3<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_26_111\">https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_26_111<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_26_211\">https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_26_211<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_26_105\">https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_26_105<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/500-billion-euro-crisis-fund-could-be-used-defence-says-esm-chief-2026-01-30\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/500-billion-euro-crisis-fund-could-be-used-defence-says-esm-chief-2026-01-30<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The NewsFeed is a press review with a summary of a selection of articles and events that occurred in the past weeks. Keep track! Focus: Greenland Threats Highlight Need for Greater European Defence Autonomy Recent U.S. posturing over Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, has once again<a class=\"moretag\" href=\"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/2026\/02\/01\/newsfeed-january-2026\/\"> Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1904"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1904"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1904\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1907,"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1904\/revisions\/1907"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1904"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1904"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/e-d-n.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1904"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}