Focus: Europe’s Response to the Iran-Gulf Crisis

As tensions escalate in the Gulf, European involvement is shifting from diplomatic positioning to operational defence engagement – particularly in the domains of air defence and counter-drone warfare.

The escalation of the conflict involving Iran has drawn European actors into an increasingly operational role, with a growing focus on defensive capabilities rather than direct military intervention. While the European Union remains institutionally cautious, recent actions by Member States point to a more active and technologically driven engagement. 

A defining feature of the current conflict is the extensive use of missiles and drones, which has reshaped the operational environment and forced rapid adaptation. European responses have centred on air defence systems, naval protection, and drone countermeasures, reflecting both immediate security needs and longer-term capability gaps. 

France has taken a leading role through the deployment of warships and the engagement of air defence assets in the Gulf. These efforts are aimed at protecting commercial shipping routes and intercepting aerial threats, particularly drones targeting maritime and energy infrastructure. As reported by the Associated Press, France’s deployment also carries a diplomatic dimension, signalling European commitment to regional stability while maintaining deterrence.

This approach is further reflected in France’s support for coordinated maritime initiatives in the Strait of Hormuz, as outlined at the conference held in Elysee Palace on the 17th of April. The initiative emphasised the importance of the safeguarding of freedom of navigation and the reinforcement of collective maritime security efforts. 

Italy has complemented this approach by focusing on defence support to regional partners. Following Iranian strikes, Rome announced plans to provide air defence assistance to Gulf states, responding to growing demand for protection against aerial threats. According to Reuters, this move reflects both solidarity with regional partners and recognition of the evolving threat posed by drones and missile systems. 

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has prioritised maritime and aerial security, including the deployment of minesweeping drones to support the reopening and protection of the Strait of Hormuz. As highlighted by The Guardian, ensuring safe navigation through this chokepoint remains critical to global energy flows and international trade. 

Taken together, these actions illustrate a European approach centred on defensive technological engagement, where counter-drone systems and air defence capabilities are becoming central tools of crisis response. The increasing use of low-cost drones has created a structural asymmetry, placing sustained pressure on high-cost interception systems and exposing vulnerabilities in European defence readiness.

At the same time, European engagement is unfolding against a backdrop of emerging tensions with the United States. While the crisis has been driven in part by US-linked regional dynamics, European states have largely avoided direct participation in offensive operations. This divergence has led to subtle friction, particularly as Washington calls for greater burden-sharing and a more assertive European role.

The situation also highlights Europe’s continued dependence on US capabilities, particularly in air defence and advanced military technologies. As the United States balances commitments across multiple theatres, questions around European strategic autonomy and defence industrial capacity are becoming increasingly pressing.

External Military Operations & Cooperations

Greece Expands Gulf Defence Role Amid Escalating Regional Tensions

Greece’s military engagement in the Gulf has deepened significantly in recent weeks, moving beyond its established Patriot air defence mission in Saudi Arabia to encompass new defensive assistance to the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Athens has supplied anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic munitions to the UAE under a 2020 bilateral cooperation agreement, following a formal request from Abu Dhabi, while a separate transfer of materials to Qatar was coordinated with American forces at Al Udeid Air Base. Defence Minister Nikos Dendias travelled to Abu Dhabi to oversee the engagement, meeting with senior UAE leadership including President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In all cases, Athens has been explicit that its assistance is exclusively defensive in nature, aimed at protecting critical infrastructure across Gulf states.

On the ground, Greece’s Patriot battery stationed in Yanbu under the ELDYSA mission has moved from a protective posture into active combat, successfully intercepting Iranian-origin threats on multiple occasions –  including ballistic missiles in March and a suspected Shahed-136 drone on Easter Monday. Defence Minister Dendias described the operational experience gained as “indispensable” for Greece’s own defence preparedness, and Prime Minister Mitsotakis has consistently framed the mission as stabilising global energy markets rather than constituting involvement in the regional conflict. The battery’s performance has significantly elevated Greece’s military credibility across the Gulf region.

The expansion of Greece’s role carries both strategic rewards and domestic tensions. Each Patriot interceptor costs between €3-4 million against drones valued at roughly €50,000, drawing scrutiny over cost-effectiveness at home. Yet Greek officials argue the broader bilateral relationships – encompassing Saudi and Emirati investment in Greek infrastructure, as well as past UAE support supplying components and ammunition for Hellenic Navy and Apache helicopter units – more than justify the commitment. Perhaps most significantly, Athens is sending a clear geopolitical signal: that it honours the agreements it signs, a pointed contrast to Turkey, which has reportedly been targeted by Iranian missiles on at least four occasions despite its own regional entanglements

Indra and Hanwha Partner on Spain’s €4.55 Billion Artillery Modernisation

Spain has taken a significant step in modernising its land warfare capabilities, with domestic defence firm Indra signing a binding agreement with South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace to produce 280 tracked vehicles for the Spanish Armed Forces based on Hanwha’s K9 155mm self-propelled howitzer. The €4.55 billion programme encompasses 128 artillery vehicles, 120 ammunition resupply vehicles, and additional recovery and command-and-control units. Crucially, Indra will hold design authority over the hull, with manufacturing centred at its plant in Gijón — positioning Spain, for the first time, among European nations with sovereign capacity to design and produce tracked land platforms.

The deal reflects both the lessons of Ukraine and the broader reorientation of European defence procurement. Artillery has become a priority investment area across the continent following Russia’s 2022 invasion, with European nations spending over $15 billion on rocket and tube artillery between May 2022 and July 2024. Hanwha’s K9 has emerged as the platform of choice for several European armies, helping South Korea become the second-largest arms supplier to European NATO members after the United States — typically by offering significant technology transfer and local industrial partnerships, as demonstrated here. Spain has also separately budgeted €2.9 billion for wheeled self-propelled artillery as part of its wider defence modernisation plan.

Beyond its military significance, the Indra-Hanwha agreement carries an important industrial policy dimension. The €130 million investment required to retool Indra’s Gijón facility signals a long-term commitment to building domestic defence manufacturing capacity, reducing Spain’s dependence on foreign suppliers for critical land systems. In a European security environment increasingly defined by the need for resilient supply chains and rapid replenishment capability, the deal illustrates how transatlantic and trans-Pacific industrial partnerships can serve as a pragmatic bridge while European sovereign capacity is built up.

Italy’s TB3 Deal and Turkey’s EU Ambitions: A Convergence Shaped by Capability and Tension

Italy’s decision to procure Bayraktar TB3 drones for deployment aboard the Cavour is more than a technical upgrade. While the acquisition runs through LBA Systems, the joint venture between Leonardo and Baykar, it still contrasts with the EU’s stated ambition to prioritise European defence production.

Operationally, the rationale is clear. Italy becomes the first European country to field a carrier-capable armed drone, filling a gap that European programmes have yet to close. Strategically, however, the decision highlights a structural reality: when timelines matter, European alternatives are not always available.

This is where the procurement intersects with Turkey’s broader push for deeper integration into Europe’s defence architecture. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler has openly criticised the EU’s reluctance to include Ankara in its defence frameworks, arguing that excluding non-EU NATO allies ultimately weakens European security. The TB3 case gives substance to that claim: Turkey is already supplying capabilities that European states are willing to adopt.

At the same time, regional dynamics complicate this trajectory. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently warned that emerging cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Israel amounts to a “source of concern” for Turkey and other countries in the region. His remarks reflect a broader perception in Ankara: that parts of Europe are not only reluctant to integrate Turkey, but are also aligning in ways that may counterbalance it.

The result is a layered contradiction. Europe is preparing for a future with less predictable U.S. support, a shift associated with positions taken by President Donald Trump, and is seeking greater autonomy. Yet in practice, it continues to rely on Turkish defence capabilities while keeping Ankara at arm’s length politically.

Italy’s TB3 procurement does not resolve this tension. It sharpens it.

NATO’s New Cold War: The Battle Beneath the North Atlantic

Russia’s Northern Fleet submarine force has emerged as one of the most pressing security challenges facing NATO, prompting a sustained intensification of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations across the High North and North Atlantic reminiscent of Cold War-era cat-and-mouse dynamics. Unlike Russian conventional forces, which have suffered well-documented degradation in Ukraine, the submarine force has been a consistent priority for investment under Putin, with five Borei-A class ballistic missile submarines and four Yasen-M class attack submarines added in recent years, backed by a federal naval funding programme of approximately $100 billion over ten years announced in April 2025. A rare public glimpse of the stakes came on 9 April, when British Defence Secretary John Healey confirmed that allied forces, working with Norway, had disrupted a covert Russian operation targeting subsea infrastructure in UK waters, tracking a Russian attack submarine continuously for weeks before intervening.

Norway sits at the centre of NATO’s response. Deep inside a mountain near Bodø, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters at Reitan coordinates allied monitoring of Russian submarine movements around the clock, drawing on sensors spanning the seafloor to space. Norwegian Defence Minister Tore Sandvik has stated bluntly that NATO does not lose track of Russian submarines, though the head of the Royal Navy acknowledged the alliance is “holding on in the Atlantic, but only just.” Advances in detection technology are pushing the intercept line northward, from the traditional GIUK gap toward the Barents Sea itself, as NATO seeks to track submarines before they can reach the deep waters off Norway’s coast. RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland serves as a key operational hub, with P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft conducting continuous reconnaissance, and the Ministry of Defence recording a 30% increase in Russian submarine incursions into UK waters over the past two years.

The response is increasingly a collective European effort. Germany has ordered eight P-8 Poseidons, is jointly procuring submarines with Norway, and recently dispatched Defence Minister Pistorius to Lossiemouth. Norway struck a £10 billion deal with the UK for at least five Type 26 frigates optimised for ASW. Canada is in talks with Germany’s TKMS over 12 new submarines. Meanwhile, Norwegian defence technology firm Havguard is developing AI-driven underwater sensor systems capable of communicating through polar ice – the preferred hiding ground of Russia’s ballistic missile submarines. Bodø itself, chosen to host NATO’s third Combined Air Operations Centre, is being revitalised by the renewed strategic attention. The broader picture is unambiguous: the Arctic has returned as a focal point of great power competition, and Europe is increasingly taking the lead in defending it.

International Relations

Italy and Ukraine Eye Joint Drone Production

On Wednesday 15 April 2026, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met in Rome (Italy) to discuss strengthening their military and defence cooperation. 

Since it was established in August 2025, Zelenskyy has been working to pressure European countries and NATO members to join the PURL (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List) initiative, with general success and two thirds of NATO allies declaring their willingness to get involved according to the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. 

After the meeting in Rome, even if without official details released, Meloni declared to reporters that “Italy in particular is very interested in developing joint production, especially in the area of drones, a sector in which we know very well that Ukraine has in recent years become a leading nation.” highlighting Ukraine’s expertise in the ‘drones sector’ gained during the ongoing war with Russia. 

NATO and Australia Discuss Deeper Defence Cooperation

As global security dynamics evolve, cooperation between NATO and Australia is increasingly moving beyond traditional partnership frameworks toward deeper industrial and capability integration.

The meeting held on 16 April 2026 at NATO Headquarters reflects this shift. Discussions focused on strengthening defence industrial cooperation, enhancing capability development, and reinforcing interoperability—priorities that have gained urgency in light of Russia’s war against Ukraine and broader geopolitical instability.

A central theme of the dialogue was the importance of defence industrial resilience. The conflict in Ukraine has exposed structural constraints across allied defence sectors, including limited production capacity, supply chain vulnerabilities, and the challenges of sustaining long-term military support. In response, NATO and its partners are placing greater emphasis on scaling industrial output and diversifying supply chains. Australia, with its growing defence industrial base and increased investment in national capabilities, is positioned as a valuable partner in this effort.

Beyond industrial cooperation, the meeting highlighted opportunities for collaboration in emerging and disruptive technologies. Areas such as cyber defence, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems are becoming central to modern military operations. NATO’s innovation frameworks, including initiatives aimed at accelerating the integration of new technologies into operational use, provide a platform for engagement with partners like Australia. Strengthening cooperation in these domains supports both capability development and technological interoperability.

Interoperability remains a cornerstone of NATO–Australia relations. Australia’s longstanding contributions to NATO-led operations, particularly in Afghanistan, have established a high level of operational compatibility. Current efforts aim to extend this interoperability to new domains, ensuring alignment not only in systems and equipment but also in standards, procedures, and doctrines. This is essential for effective joint operations and coordinated responses to complex security challenges.

The April 2026 discussions also reflect NATO’s broader strategic adaptation. While the Alliance remains regionally anchored in the Euro-Atlantic, its engagement with partners in the Indo-Pacific has become increasingly relevant. Cooperation with Australia—alongside other key partners—demonstrates NATO’s recognition that security challenges are interconnected across regions. Issues such as hybrid threats, cyber risks, and the protection of critical infrastructure require coordinated approaches that extend beyond traditional geographic boundaries.

From a policy perspective, NATO–Australia cooperation illustrates a gradual transition from a primarily operational partnership to a more comprehensive framework encompassing industrial, technological, and strategic dimensions. This evolution aligns with a broader shift in defence policy, where the integration of industrial capacity, innovation ecosystems, and operational capabilities is essential to maintaining credible deterrence.

Iran War Ripple Effect: US Weapons Delays Put Baltic States on Alert

The United States has formally notified Estonia and Lithuania of potential delays in planned weapons and ammunition deliveries, with the Iran conflict diverting US military logistics capacity away from previously scheduled European shipments. At a joint press conference on 17 April, Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal confirmed his government had been informed and described the US as remaining a strong ally, while Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė acknowledged that delivery deadlines are “moving,” though she stopped short of characterising it as a significant problem. Latvia’s Prime Minister Evika Siliņa noted her government had not yet received official notification, but indicated Riga was monitoring the situation closely.

The most concrete concern to emerge relates to HIMARS ammunition. Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur confirmed that ammunition deliveries for the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System have been put on hold, raising questions about the readiness implications for a country that only received its first six HIMARS systems in April 2025 and placed an order for three additional systems earlier this month, with deliveries scheduled for 2027. All three Baltic states have purchased HIMARS, making the potential delay a shared vulnerability across the region. Pevkur also raised the question of alternative ammunition sources, noting that while other manufacturers could theoretically supply compatible rounds, doing so would still require explicit authorisation from Lockheed Martin and the US government.

The episode exposes a structural tension at the heart of European defence planning. At the very moment that Baltic states are accelerating procurement to address the Russian threat, the US – their principal arms supplier and security guarantor – is redirecting military resources toward a separate theatre of conflict. The delays are a tangible illustration of why the push for greater European defence industrial autonomy and reduced dependency on US supply chains for critical munitions has moved from a political aspiration to an operational necessity. For the Baltic states in particular, where geography and threat proximity leave little margin for capability gaps, the message is unambiguous: resilient, diversified supply chains are no longer optional.

NATO Poised to Select Saab GlobalEye as AWACS Replacement in Historic Shift Away from Boeing

NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency has selected Sweden’s Saab and Canada’s Bombardier to replace the alliance’s ageing fleet of Boeing E-3A Sentry airborne warning and control system aircraft with the GlobalEye platform – marking the first time since 1982 that a non-Boeing aircraft will serve as NATO’s common airborne surveillance backbone. The decision caps a turbulent procurement saga that began in 2023 when NATO awarded a replacement contract to Boeing’s E-7A Wedgetail without a competitive tender, only for the entire programme to unravel after the US Air Force dropped the E-7 from its fiscal 2026 spending plan in June 2025, citing delays, cost overruns, and survivability concerns. By November 2025, European NATO partners formally scrapped the Wedgetail buy, with the Dutch State Secretary for Defence explicitly framing the decision as a vindication of investing in European industry. A formal contract announcement from NATO is still pending, though a reversal of the outcome at this stage appears unlikely.

The GlobalEye, built around Saab’s Erieye Extended Range active electronically scanned array radar mounted on a Bombardier Global 6000 or 6500 airframe, offers detection ranges exceeding 550 kilometres across air, sea, and land domains. NATO’s NSPA is reported to be eyeing between 10 and 12 aircraft at approximately €550 million per unit – a total acquisition value likely exceeding €5 billion before sustainment and infrastructure costs – with Saab claiming the platform can meet NATO’s 2031 operational target. Political momentum behind the GlobalEye has been building steadily, with France signing a contract for two aircraft in December 2025, and strong interest reported from Poland, Germany, and Canada, which is weighing up to six platforms of its own.

The broader significance of the selection extends well beyond a single procurement decision. The collapse of the Boeing Wedgetail deal, driven in large part by US industrial dysfunction and Washington’s own withdrawal from the programme, has delivered a powerful illustration of the risks of dependence on American platforms for NATO’s most critical shared capabilities. That European partners responded by pivoting to a non-US solution reflects a growing conviction that strategic autonomy must be built into alliance infrastructure, not merely aspired to. For Saab, securing NATO’s airborne surveillance backbone would represent a transformational commercial and industrial milestone, cementing Sweden’s role as a tier-one supplier to the alliance at a moment of historic rearmament.

Industry updates

Meloni Ousts Leonardo CEO

An earthquake within Leonardo’s walls, the main Italian industry in the defence sector, owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy (30%), when the political decision of substituting its CEO Roberto Cingolani was effective in the month of April 2026. 

Amidst a climate of changes within the Italian political sphere, during the month of April the government has submitted lists of names for the renewal of the boards of directors of four major companies owned by the Ministry of Economy: in addition to Leonardo, there are the energy companies Enel and Eni, and the company that manages Italian airspace, Enav according to the Italian newspaper “Il post”. 

When appointing Cingolani in 2023, some doubts were raised by the current administration and more specifically by the Italian Defence Ministry Crosetto and the Italian Ministry of Economy Giorgetti, being Cingolani a physicist with not much of experience in diplomacy; however, its performance as leader of Leonardo was highly appreciated considering the successes of the industry and the good results of the last years. 

Nevertheless, following Cingolani’s tendency not to comply with all directives, not to grant certain sponsorships, or to remove people from positions of responsibility without first consulting with the government, will be substituted with Lorenzo Mariani currently working as a manager for MBDA. 

Edgewing Receives Contract for GCAP Development

An agreement was reached regarding a temporary financing process to ensure that the “Global Combat Air Programme” does not suffer any interruptions and development of the new generation of fighter jets continues as planned. The process (designed as an interim measure) has been created as a stopgap measure as the UK prepares its overall financing plan.

The arrangement involves the signing of a £686mil ($906mil) contract with Edgewing, the joint industrial company founded by the three countries’ defense contractors: BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Co., Ltd.. This short-term funding is expected to last for approximately three months and includes the maintenance of the main development efforts, both from a design and engineering perspective; with a final goal to deliver the sixth-generation fighter aircraft by 2035.

It needs to be quite remarkable how the contract lies in the fact that it is a unified agreement for the first time between the three states and a single industrial corporation. This indicates a major shift in the current process as previously each state developed their fighters independently.

The necessity of having such an arrangement as a “bridge” is attributed to the existing uncertainties around the delay of the UK’s Defence Investment Plan that has yet to see the light of day due to financial difficulties and £28bil shortage of defense spending projections. The partners’ apprehensions about possible delays of the program have been also raised concerns by some of the participants, especially by Japan.

From this point of view, the temporary financing plays an important role since it provides continuity of technological research, at the same time reinforcing the importance of trilateral cooperation. Eventually, by having industrial management by Edgewing and preserving engineering activities despite financial uncertainties, the three countries seek to guarantee the success of GCAP within the scope of its implementation.

Germany allocates €300 to Rheinmetall to expand its drone fleet

The German Parliament approved a €300 million deal to procure kamikaze drones from Rheinmetall. The procurement is part of a greater German push to secure modern drones for the armed forces. In February a similar deal worth €270 million was signed with German startups Helsing and Stark. Both agreements allow for further procurements over the next seven years, potentially up to €2.9 billion. Germany aimed to buy from three different suppliers to mitigate risks and to diversify. The country also intends to learn from the war in Ukraine about how modern wars will be conducted. The deal represents a success for Rheinmetall’s push into new domains such as drone, naval and space warfare. It should also prove that the company manages to adapt to the new challenges of war after the CEO Armin Papperger made some unfortunate, disparaging remarks on Ukraine’s drone innovation in March, drawing anger and ridicule.

Estonia Pivots from Armour to Drones in Landmark Procurement Shift

Estonia has announced the suspension of its planned €500 million purchase of new infantry fighting vehicles to replace its ageing CV90 fleet, redirecting funds toward drone and air defence capabilities instead. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur cited the diminishing battlefield utility of heavy armoured platforms, concluding it was not “reasonable to replace” the CV90s over the next decade. Rather than a full fleet overhaul, Tallinn will extend the service life of its existing vehicles by up to ten years – a decision to be formally confirmed as part of Estonia’s annual spring review of its four-year defence budget, which allocated €10 billion to national defence capabilities for 2026-2029.

The decision is a direct product of lessons drawn from Ukraine, where the vulnerability of conventional armoured vehicles to drone strikes has fundamentally altered assessments of land warfare. Recent incidents have reinforced the urgency: on 25 March, Ukrainian drones launched against the Russian port of Ust-Luga inadvertently entered Estonian airspace, with one striking a power plant chimney – a vivid illustration of the threat environment Tallinn now faces. The freed-up funds are expected to be redirected toward unmanned systems and layered air defence, consistent with Estonia’s broader doctrine of “active defence,” which prioritises deep strike capabilities and forward deterrence to prevent conflict reaching Estonian soil.

The move is emblematic of a wider doctrinal recalibration underway across European militaries, particularly among smaller NATO members on the Alliance’s eastern flank. Where conventional thinking once prioritised armoured manoeuvre forces, the Ukraine war has elevated drones, electronic warfare, and air defence to the top of procurement priority lists. Estonia’s willingness to cancel a major platform programme – even one that had already attracted interest from BAE Systems, General Dynamics, and Hanwha – signals that this shift is no longer theoretical but is now driving concrete budgetary choices at the national level.

Finland Expands Artillery Firepower with Second K9 Procurement from South Korea

Finland has signed a government-to-government contract with South Korea’s Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) for the purchase of 112 surplus K9 155mm self-propelled howitzers, along with associated spare parts, tools and test equipment, at a total value of approximately €546.8 million. The deal, signed on 9 April 2026, marks Finland’s second major K9 acquisition, following an initial purchase of 96 systems in 2017 through the same procurement channel. The new howitzers will partially replace ageing towed artillery equipment, enhancing the Finnish Army’s firepower and its capacity to support operational forces with mobile, long-range artillery.

The procurement fits within Finland’s broader decade-long army modernisation programme as outlined in its Government Defence Report, and is included within the Ministry of Defence’s existing planned budget framework. Crucially, Finland already possesses established domestic maintenance and sustainment capability for the K9 system from its earlier acquisition, meaning the new platforms will undergo national modifications before entering service without requiring significant additional infrastructure investment. Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen described the deal as both a cost-effective capability enhancement and a demonstration of the deepening defence relationship between Helsinki and Seoul.

The purchase further cements South Korea’s position as a pivotal arms supplier to European NATO members, with the K9 emerging as the continent’s self-propelled howitzer of choice. Finland joins a growing list of European operators that includes Norway, Estonia, Poland, and Romania, with Spain also recently committing to a major K9-based programme. The Ukraine war’s reaffirmation of artillery as a decisive instrument of modern warfare continues to drive demand, and South Korea’s willingness to offer government-to-government deals with favourable terms and established maintenance frameworks has made it a partner of first choice for European militaries seeking rapid, cost-effective capability uplift.

France Orders Fifth FDI Frigate, Completing Naval Group’s Flagship Surface Combatant Programme

On 31 March 2026, the French Government’s defence procurement agency notified the order for a fifth Defence and Intervention Frigate (FDI) from Naval Group, completing the full series planned under France’s Military Programming Law (LPM). The order follows the fourth FDI frigate commissioned just months earlier in December 2025, reflecting an accelerated pace of naval procurement as France seeks to reinforce its maritime capabilities amid a deteriorating security environment. All five vessels are being built at Naval Group’s facility in Lorient, and when combined with four FDI frigates already ordered by the Hellenic Navy, the total production run for the class reaches nine ships – a significant industrial milestone for the French naval sector.

The FDI represents a generational leap in French surface combatant capability. Designed for high-intensity combat across all warfare domains – anti-aircraft, anti-submarine, anti-surface and asymmetric – the frigate incorporates advanced digital and data processing technologies to counter threats ranging from latest-generation submarines and supersonic missiles to cyberattacks. Its reduced crew requirement, high operational availability, and NATO-standard interoperability make it a versatile asset both for independent operations and fleet integration. The lead ship, the Admiral Ronarc’h, has already demonstrated its seakeeping credentials during sea trials in the Atlantic.

The completion of the FDI order carries broader strategic significance beyond French national capability. With Greece also operating the platform, the FDI is emerging as a cornerstone of European naval interoperability, and Naval Group’s ability to deliver a full nine-ship production run positions France as a key driver of the continent’s naval industrial base. In the context of rising maritime threats across the Mediterranean and beyond, the order underscores France’s commitment to maintaining first-rank naval power – and to ensuring its defence industry retains the capacity to deliver at scale.

US Approves AEGIS/SPY-6 Sale for Germany’s F127 Frigate Programme

The United States has approved a potential Foreign Military Sale to Germany of an AEGIS-based Integrated Combat System package valued at $11.9 billion, covering eight complete shipsets intended to equip the German Navy’s future F127 air and missile defence frigates. The package includes eight sets of the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Active Electronically Scanned Array radar – the most advanced naval radar currently in US service – alongside Mk 41 Vertical Launch Systems expanded to 96 cells per vessel, Cooperative Engagement Capability, and a comprehensive suite of fire control, electronic warfare, and navigation systems. Principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin and RTX Corporation. The F127 programme, based on the TKMS MEKO A400 Air Missile Defence concept, has grown considerably in ambition since its inception, with the German Navy now targeting eight hulls – up from an original six – reflecting the rapidly deteriorating European security environment and an elevated priority on ballistic missile defence.

The sale represents a significant strategic choice by Berlin, opting for American combat systems over the European-developed Tacticos/APAR suite currently fitted to the existing Sachsen-class frigates. The transition also extends to armament, with Germany moving from the Leonardo 127mm main gun to the American Mk 45 equivalent, and adding the Mk 38 Mod 4 30mm remote weapon station to address the growing threat from drone systems. Notably, Japanese defence electronics firm Mitsubishi Electric will produce components for the SPY-6 radar sets, illustrating how even the most sensitive American defence programmes are increasingly drawing on diversified global supply chains. The F127s are expected to enter service from the mid-2030s, with full displacement likely approaching or exceeding 12,000 tonnes.

The approval carries broader implications for European defence industrial policy. Germany’s decision to anchor its next-generation surface combatant around American systems – at a moment when the EU is pushing hard for greater defence industrial autonomy – reflects the enduring reality that for high-end capabilities such as ballistic missile defence, US technology remains without a credible European alternative. At the same time, the scale of the F127 programme underscores Germany’s commitment under Chancellor Merz to rebuild genuine warfighting capability, positioning the German Navy as a central pillar of NATO’s integrated air and missile defence architecture in the decades ahead.

Spain Selects SUPERAV Amphibious Vehicle with Indra as Lead Integrator

Spain has selected the SUPERAV 8×8 amphibious combat vehicle, the same platform operated by the US Marines as the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, for its marine infantry forces, with Spanish defence firm Indra signed on as lead systems integrator. Under the arrangement, Indra has struck a deal with Italy’s IDV, the vehicle’s design authority and intellectual property owner, to integrate mission systems onto 34 vehicles to be delivered from IDV. Designated the Marine Infantry Amphibious Combat Vehicle, or VACIM in Spain, the programme will encompass troop transport, command and control, recovery, and ambulance variants, tailored to Spanish Ministry of Defence requirements.

The SUPERAV has a proven multinational pedigree. Originally developed through a partnership between IDV and BAE Systems,  signed in 2011 and contracted by the US Marines in 2018, the vehicle has since been adopted by Italy, which ordered 36 platforms in 2022 with expectations of expanding to 64. Spain becomes the third operator of the type, joining a growing community of users that lends the platform long-term industrial and logistical sustainability. Notably, while US vehicles feature a Kongsberg 30mm turret, both the Italian and now Spanish variants reflect national customisation preferences, illustrating the platform’s adaptability across different operational requirements.

The deal also reinforces Indra’s growing role as a prime integrator in Spanish defence programmes, following its recently announced partnership with Hanwha Aerospace for the €4.55 billion K9-based self-propelled artillery programme. Together, these contracts signal a deliberate Spanish industrial strategy – using domestic firms as lead integrators on major foreign platform acquisitions to build sovereign capability, transfer technology, and anchor high-value defence work within Spain’s own industrial base.

Poland’s PGZ Targets Record Sales as Europe’s Defence Spending Spree Takes Hold

Poland’s state-owned defence conglomerate PGZ SA is on course for another record year, having seen revenues surge by approximately 50% in 2025 from a base of 13.9 billion zloty, with comparable growth expected in 2026. The company is the primary industrial beneficiary of Poland’s extraordinary defence spending trajectory – which reached nearly 5% of GDP in 2025, the highest ratio in NATO – receiving a flood of domestic orders spanning ammunition, tanks, howitzers, and air defence systems. Warsaw’s broader ambition is to transform what was historically a fragmented collection of small manufacturers into a regionally significant defence industrial powerhouse, with PGZ at its centre. Deputy CEO Arkadiusz Bak has been candid about the structural shift underway, describing defence as now a primary driver of technological development across the wider economy.

The EU’s new SAFE defence loan programme is expected to be the single largest driver of PGZ’s growth in 2026. Poland is slated to receive roughly a third of the €150 billion scheme and intends to direct the bulk of those funds toward domestic producers, positioning PGZ as the lead recipient. The programme has not been without domestic friction, President Nawrocki vetoed legislation facilitating access to the funds, citing concerns over long-term foreign credit dependency, but Premier Tusk has found a legislative workaround to proceed. Beyond SAFE, PGZ has secured a 60% stake in Poland’s planned “anti-drone wall” project developed jointly with Norway’s Kongsberg, part of a broader €15 billion counter-drone initiative to secure the country’s eastern border following Russian drone incursions last September.

Critically, PGZ is moving deliberately beyond the role of assembly line manufacturer. Technology transfer agreements with Rheinmetall, Rolls-Royce Solutions, Hyundai Rotem, and Anduril Industries signal an ambition to develop genuine sovereign industrial capability rather than simply producing under licence. The company has thus far resisted going public, a contrast to Czech rival CSG, valued at €21 billion after its successful Amsterdam debut, with any share sale decision resting with the Polish government. Bak’s framing of the company’s growth story is telling: in his view, the driving force is not geopolitical alignment with any particular partner, but the fundamental logic of supply chain resilience — the need for every country to have certainty over its own defence supplies.

France Accelerates Deep Strike Ambitions with Ballistic Missiles, Rocket Artillery and Future Tank

France has provided its most comprehensive public update yet on its long-range strike modernisation agenda, with the head of the Directorate General for Armaments, Patrick Pailloux, briefing the National Assembly on 15 April under the framework of the 2024-2030 Military Programming Law. On rocket artillery, France is nearing a procurement decision on a domestic replacement for its ageing LRU multiple rocket launcher systems, with initial tests of French-developed systems going well, targeting 26 launchers and 300 munitions to equip a full battalion by 2030. Two competing domestic consortia are in contention: Safran and MBDA on one side, Thales and ArianeGroup on the other, with foreign alternatives including Hanwha’s Chunmoo, Elbit’s PULS, and HIMARS also under evaluation. A decision is expected within weeks once comparative testing is complete.

The more strategically significant announcement concerns France’s Missile Balistique Terrestre programme, a ground-launched ballistic missile system with a target range of up to 2,500 kilometres, backed by €1.1 billion within the LPM. Led by ArianeGroup, which also produces France’s M51 submarine-launched ballistic missile, the MBT draws on established solid-rocket motor expertise and could incorporate a hypersonic glide vehicle in its most advanced variant. Initial studies begin in 2026, with an entry into service projected for 2035, a timeline Pailloux acknowledged was later than desired and one he intends to accelerate. The programme represents France’s return to conventional ballistic missile capability after a thirty-year gap, framed explicitly as reducing dependence on allied systems and reinforcing French technological sovereignty.

Both programmes carry significant implications for European defence cohesion. The MBT in particular has attracted little visible enthusiasm from France’s European partners, raising questions about whether Paris can reconcile a nationally focused, high-prestige ballistic missile effort with its commitments to multilateral deep-strike initiatives under the European Long-Range Strike Approach. Critics, including supporters of the programme within the National Assembly itself, have warned that exclusive French procurement risks prohibitively high unit costs and limited operational stocks. France is simultaneously pursuing a broad portfolio of thirteen distinct long-range and deep-strike systems – from affordable one-way effectors to the future Rafale F5 standard – a breadth of ambition that raises legitimate questions about financial and industrial feasibility, even as it positions Paris as a potential European leader in precision strike capability.

European policies

Belgium Aims To Punch Above Its Weight In Defence Production

With Belgium’s defence industry traditionally linked to small arms and ammunitions, the country is now gradually shifting to other advanced sections of the industry. More specifically, enterprises are becoming more oriented towards high-added value products needed for assembling complicated weapons systems, especially in niche sectors that are usually not addressed by large multinational firms.

In addition, Belgium is gearing up for growing defence expenditures. Concretely, state spending on the national armed forces is planned to amount to 2% of GDP in 2029 and to 2.5% in 2034 in accordance with NATO requirements and this expansion is to be facilitated by structural budget changes along with the creation of a special Defence Fund.

At present, the basic defence industry in Belgium consists of more than 80 companies, earning a yearly income of about €2 billion and employing 5,000 people. However, if all related economic activity sectors are accounted for, the numbers will increase to 900 companies making up €5 billion of revenue and employing over 16,000 employees. Defence minister Theo Francken has also highlighted the need for a stronger industrial base, calling for a federal-regional cooperation agreement before the summer in order to “ramp up our military production as soon as possible”. 

The trend at the national level is indeed enshrined in a larger change in the European Union towards rearming and independence. In other terms, there is the urge to build an “ecosystem” around defence to strengthen the resilience of our society and further anchor our defence industry.

NATO-EU “Turf War” Over Defence Coordination

The European Union is flanked by an adversary to the East and an unreliable ally to the West. If the United States disengages its nearly 68,000 active-duty military personnel from its 31 permanent bases and 19 military sites, Russia could seize the opportunity to act against the Baltic states. The current European defense acquisition systems are no longer effective in the current geopolitical landscape. The EU lags in space and all-domain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets compared to Russia and the US.  Strategic uncertainty has driven a rise in procurement orders in the land domain, and according to SIPRI, European nations have tripled their arms imports. However, Europe is still lagging in sovereign capacity in the naval and aerospace sectors. To address this gap, it will take approximately $1 trillion in investment and an overhaul of systems for quick decision-making, rapid deployment capacity, and sustainable scale. Now is the time to align on defense industry policy in Europe and address the following questions: Who will manage the production scale-up? What impact will management of production have on the weapons Europe will deploy in future deterrence or conflict?

NATO HQ and the EU agree that Europe needs to assume greater responsibility for its own conventional defence. The unresolved question is whether this rearmament surge will deepen dependence on American hardware and military systems, or accelerate the development of a sovereign European defence industrial complex. NATO opposes the EU’s ‘Buy European’ strategy across broader industrial policies in an attempt to maintain transatlantic unity.  There’s a tension between NATO’s preference to keep defence industrial policy transatlantic and the EU’s desire for strategic autonomy. While the rest of the world has eyes on the conflict between Iran and the United States, the EU needs to have eyes on the real enemy to the East and protect the Baltic countries from looming threats.

France and Greece Renew and Deepen Landmark Defence Pact

France and Greece have renewed their landmark bilateral defence agreement for a further five years, with French President Emmanuel Macron travelling to Athens on 24-25 April following an EU leaders’ summit in Cyprus to meet Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and formalise the deal. First signed in 2021 – alongside Greece’s purchase of Rafale fighter jets and FDI frigates from Naval Group – the pact has since served as a cornerstone of the Franco-Greek strategic relationship. The renewed agreement goes further than its predecessor, introducing an automatic renewal clause that embeds the partnership on a permanent institutional footing, and expanding cooperation across defence, foreign policy, civil protection, nuclear technology, education, and economic affairs. In a symbolic gesture underscoring the industrial dimension of the partnership, both leaders visited the Hellenic Navy’s FDI frigate Kimon at the port of Piraeus.

The signing came with an unambiguous political message. Macron declared the mutual defence assistance clause – under which both countries commit to support each other in the event of a threat to their sovereignty – “inviolable” and “not up for debate,” adding pointedly: “Whatever happens, we will be there by your side.” The remarks were widely interpreted as a direct signal toward Turkey, given longstanding tensions over maritime boundaries and airspace. Mitsotakis described France as “Greece’s true ally” and called the partnership “a game-changer” for European defence, pointing to both countries’ joint response to Cyprus after a Shahed drone struck a British base on the island in March as proof that the EU’s own mutual defence clause under Article 42.7 carries real operational weight – and should be taken more seriously across the bloc.

The renewal carries significance well beyond bilateral ties. Both leaders framed the Franco-Greek partnership as a model for broader European defence integration, explicitly linking it to the EU’s push for strategic autonomy amid growing uncertainty over US commitment to NATO. Macron argued that Europe must “no longer be dependent,” while Mitsotakis urged EU partners to shed “national egotism” in favour of deeper industrial cooperation. Taken together, the Athens summit signals that the Franco-Greek axis is evolving from a procurement relationship into a fully fledged strategic alliance – one that both Paris and Athens are positioning as a template for the next chapter of European defence.

Hungary’s Political Transition Opens Door to Reform of EU Defence Loan Allocation

Hungary is set to become the third largest recipient of the EU’s €150 billion SAFE defence loan programme, after Poland and Romania, with €16.2 billion allocated to Budapest. However, the incoming government of Peter Magyar and his Tisza party, following a landslide election victory earlier this month, is seeking to redirect those funds away from companies with ties to outgoing Prime Minister Viktor Orban. The European Commission has indicated openness to the change, and there is already a precedent: the Czech Republic undertook a similar reexamination of its proposed SAFE contracts after a change of government late last year. Hungary remains the only EU applicant country still awaiting final Commission approval for its allocation.

The political context is significant. Under Orban, Hungary became the EU’s most corruption-affected member state according to Transparency International rankings, with billions in EU funds frozen over rule-of-law and governance concerns. Magyar has pledged a fundamentally different, more pro-European approach – but unlocking the SAFE funds requires Hungary to first adopt rule-of-law reforms that the Commission has made a precondition for final approval. The timeline is tight: portions of the allocation risk expiring later this year if key deadlines are not met, adding urgency to the incoming government’s first weeks in office.

The Hungarian case highlights a broader governance challenge embedded in the SAFE programme’s design. As the EU mobilises unprecedented sums for defence investment, the question of which companies and industrial actors ultimately benefit is acquiring real political weight – not only in Hungary but across the bloc. Magyar’s determination to ensure the funds serve genuine defence capacity-building rather than enriching politically connected firms reflects a wider European imperative: that the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s defence spending surge depends as much on transparent governance as on the scale of investment itself.

Germany’s First Military Strategy Since WWII: A Continental Power Steps Forward

On 22 April 2026, Germany released its first formal military strategy since the Second World War – a document that marks a profound shift in how Europe’s largest economy conceives of its role in continental security. Announced by the Bundeswehr and backed by a €400 billion borrowing programme, the strategy acknowledges plainly that “German society as a whole is under threat,” identifying Russia as the greatest security challenge facing Europe. Most significantly, it commits Germany to assuming “conventional strategic responsibility for Europe” – an explicit declaration of intent to lead, not merely participate in, the continent’s defence. The ambition is concrete: to build the strongest conventional army in Europe by 2039.

The strategy sets out a three-phase roadmap to achieve this. The first phase focuses on rapidly increasing deterrence through the focused deployment of available resources. The second requires the Bundeswehr to credibly deter and, if necessary, defend within the alliance alongside allies. The third expands the armed forces into Europe’s pre-eminent conventional military through consistent investment in innovative technologies. To underpin this, Germany plans to grow active-duty personnel from approximately 186,000 to 260,000 by the mid-2030s, while expanding its reserve force from 70,000 to at least 200,000. Key capability priorities include territorial missile defence, a multidimensional long-range precision strike network, military mobility, and a blend of high-end systems with affordable mass-produced platforms, lessons drawn directly from the battlefield experience of Ukraine.

The broader significance of the document cannot be overstated. For decades, Germany’s post-war identity was defined by strategic restraint, a deliberate subordination of military ambition to the collective frameworks of NATO and the EU. This strategy represents the formal abandonment of that posture. Combined with Chancellor Merz’s €600 billion defence initiative and Germany’s deepening bilateral partnerships across Europe, the publication signals that Berlin is no longer content to be a large chequebook and a modest military actor. As the security environment continues to deteriorate and questions persist over US commitment to the alliance, Germany’s willingness to assume strategic leadership offers Europe both a significant capability anchor and a new centre of gravity for collective defence.

Other news

Hungarian Parliamentary Elections Dealt A Massive Blow To The International Right-wingers

After 16 years of continuous rule and 20 years as Prime Minister of Hungary in total (first time in 1998-2002) Viktor Orbán is out. In a heated race rife with extreme fearmongering, anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, deploying secret services against the opposition, in the end Orbán ended up admitting defeat surprisingly fast, on the evening of the elections. The independent pollsters predicting a landslide of Tisza victory, viciously  attacked by the ruling Fidesz party for their numbers, were proven right. In fact Medián predicted the number of seats perfectly for Tisza (141 out of 199) and Fidesz (52). It should be noted that pollsters such as Medián and Závecz have a history of reliable predictions, and instead the concerns were more related to election interference and vote fraud. In the end Tisza got the most overwhelming majority in the history of post-Communist Hungary, making it possible to address the long series of legal changes introduced by Fidesz. There are many components for this win: economic stagnation in the last couple of years, inflation, increasing perception of corruption and dysfunction of the state, the appearance of a fresh face, Péter Magyar and his practically new party, Tisza (named both for the river and short for Respect and Freedom Party). This election marked not only the ousting of Fidesz but also of most of the old opposition parties: only the right wing Mi Hazánk got in (with 6 seats). It should be noted that many parties chose to stand, learning from the loss in 2022, calculating that a Fidesz loss in 2026 is a necessity.

The new government will be sworn in on 9 May, until then Fidesz is still acting as the caretaker government. While there are concerns raised such as industrial scale shredding of documents, with shreds of papers even getting out to the streets of Budapest, and rumours of corruption money being moved in planes abroad, Fidesz and Orbán seem to be disorientated by the events. There are already talks of Fidesz stepping on the path of the Socialists, who, after the 2010 loss, continuously shrank and are now practically invisible. Perhaps to avoid a similar fate, Orbán and many prominent Fidesz members are not taking up their Parliament positions – to avoid being paraded in the Parliament and being blamed on camera for the hardships of the country. Voters meanwhile experience massive bandwagon effect and now overwhelmingly side with Tisza even in former Fidesz strongholds.

A good indication of the popular sentiment is the flood of photos and videos of the streets filled with partying voters after Fidesz admitted defeat and the change of mood in the public media – from fearmongering, catastrophising news and views to something starting to reflect normality.

While Péter Magyar’s party occupies a more pro-European and pro-NATO stance, it should be kept in mind that it is not a progressive party and it considers itself to be center right and more conservative. Its more traditional approach to national issues was a key factor in convincing past Fidesz voters to switch, as was his focus on economic and practical issues (such as hospitals, infrastructure, EU funding).

Japan Scraps Postwar Arms Export Restrictions in Historic Strategic Shift

Japan has removed most of its longstanding restrictions on weapons exports, allowing the nation to sell arms overseas for the first time since World War II in a landmark departure from its postwar pacifist orientation. The cabinet of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi approved the changes on 21 April 2026, permitting Japanese defence companies to export military equipment far beyond the previously narrow categories of rescue, transport, surveillance and minesweeping operations. Controls will remain on exports of lethal equipment to countries already engaged in conflict, though exceptions will be permitted where exports are deemed to be in Japan’s national interest. Eligible buyers will be limited to countries that have signed classified information protection agreements with Tokyo – currently 17 nations, including several European states, the UAE, India, and the United States. The move comes days after Japan signed a multibillion-dollar deal to supply advanced warships to Australia – its first postwar export of lethal war-fighting equipment – with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries as lead contractor. The government hopes the Australia deal will prove a harbinger of further export contracts, incentivising Japanese companies to invest in R&D, expand production capacity, and catch up in key areas including military drones. Japan’s defence sector, currently dominated by manufacturing and technology conglomerates for whom defence has historically accounted for less than 20% of revenue, has long been constrained by limited domestic demand and low margins. A larger export market is expected to change that calculus significantly, with Japanese defence company share prices already rising in response to Takaichi’s broader push to accelerate defence spending toward 2% of GDP.

The strategic implications extend well beyond Japan’s borders. The decision has drawn praise from the head of US Indo-Pacific Command and reflects a broader regional recalibration driven by China’s military rise and North Korea’s weapons programmes. For Europe, the development is particularly noteworthy – Japan is already contributing components to the SPY-6 radar for Germany’s F127 frigates, and its participation in the Global Combat Air Programme alongside the UK and Italy signals deepening defence-industrial integration with European partners. Tokyo’s historic shift thus marks not merely a domestic policy change but a structural expansion of the global defence market, with Japan poised to become a significant new player in an era of rapidly rising international defence spending.