The NewsFeed is a press review with a summary of a selection of articles and events that occurred in the past weeks. Keep track!

Focus: Munich Security Conference Highlights 

At the 62^nd Munich Security Conference, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized support for a “strong, independent Europe.” Such rhetorical reassurances temporarily eased political anxieties after months of heated exchanges. However, they cannot substitute a concrete security guarantee. European leaders recognize that such assurances coexist with a transactional “America First” policy logic, leaving support for EU allies conditional on US strategic interests, rather than on enduring transatlantic commitments. The gap between rhetoric and reality raises urgent questions about Europe’s ability to translate strategic ambitions into autonomous defence capacity.

In an era of “wrecking ball politics,” Munich provided relief and strategic clarity for European leaders. Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz noted that US claims to global leadership are increasingly contested, reinforcing calls for European states to assume greater responsibility for their own security. The European Commission reported that 63% of defence acquisitions by EU Member States between February 2022 and June 2023 came from the US. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), imports of major arms by European states rose 155% between 2015–19 and 2020–24, as global arms transfers plateaued. As European leaders face the prospect of restricted US support, the practical question becomes translating strategic ambition into domestic production and operational capability.  

Senior US officials signaled a more pragmatic view on the future of European defence. At a side event, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby acknowledged that if European nations significantly increased defence spending, they would “need to indigenize a large fraction of that production.” The credibility of European deterrence will ultimately depend on alliance cohesion and the continent’s ability to produce, sustain, and replenish military capacity at scale. The Munich Security Conference underscored that deterrence rests on production capacity. Alliance cohesion remains crucial, but without the ability to sustainably produce military capabilities at scale, strategic autonomy will remain aspirational. For European defence stakeholders, the conference clarified that industrial strength is no longer a secondary concern. It is the foundation upon which credible deterrence now rests.

External Military Operations & Cooperations 

Norway and Germany Sign ‘Hansa Arrangement’ to Deepen Bilateral Defence Cooperation

Norway and Germany have formalised a significant expansion of their defence partnership through the signing of the Hansa Arrangement, agreed during the 2026 Munich Security Conference. The framework was signed by Norway’s Defence Minister Tore O. Sandvik and Germany’s Federal Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius, signalling a structured and long-term commitment to enhanced military and industrial cooperation between the two NATO allies.

The agreement reflects the evolving European security environment, shaped by Russia’s sustained military assertiveness and the strategic importance of NATO’s northern and eastern flanks. Rather than establishing a single flagship project, the Hansa Arrangement creates an overarching framework covering maritime, land, air, and space domains, as well as defence industrial collaboration. Its purpose is to institutionalise cooperation and ensure continuity beyond individual procurement cycles or political terms.

Maritime security forms a central pillar of the arrangement. Both countries share strategic interests in safeguarding sea lines of communication in the North Sea and North Atlantic. Cooperation includes joint submarine programmes, expanded maintenance infrastructure, and missile development initiatives. Notably, Norway and Germany are already partners in submarine acquisition and sustainment, with enhanced maintenance capacity being developed at Norway’s Haakonsvern naval base. These efforts aim to improve readiness, logistical efficiency, and interoperability.

On land, defence alignment is reinforced through Norway’s procurement of German Leopard 2 main battle tanks, strengthening operational compatibility between the two armies. Both states also contribute to NATO’s forward presence in Eastern Europe, including participation in the multinational brigade in Lithuania. The agreement therefore complements existing NATO commitments while reinforcing bilateral defence planning. The Hansa Arrangement further recognises the increasing role of space-based capabilities in modern warfare. Cooperation in satellite communications, surveillance, and situational awareness reflects an understanding that integrated, multi-domain operations are essential to credible deterrence and crisis response.

Industrial cooperation constitutes another strategic dimension. Germany is a major supplier of defence equipment to Norway, and the arrangement seeks to expand joint research, production, and sustainment projects. From a policy perspective, this aligns with broader European efforts to strengthen defence industrial resilience and reduce fragmentation across national markets.

Overall, the Hansa Arrangement illustrates a pragmatic approach to defence integration: deepening bilateral ties within the framework of NATO while contributing to Europe’s broader security architecture. It represents a model of structured, capability-driven cooperation tailored to the demands of an increasingly contested strategic environment.

International Relations

South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace Signs $922mn Deal with Norway to Supply Rocket Launchers 

As part of Norway’s $2 billion long-range fire capability purchase program, which was recently approved by the Norwegian government, South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace has signed a $922 million agreement with Norway to supply Chunmoo with multiple rocket launchers and guided rockets. Under an agreement with Norway’s Defense Materiel Agency, Hanwha will supply sixteen Chunmoo rocket launchers and precision missiles.   

From a more technical point of view, the Chunmoo system is a multi-caliber rocket artillery system that is capable of firing different rockets from two separate pods that have been integrated into the system. These rockets have the capability to target destinations up to 80 kilometers away with twelve 239mm guided rockets or to target destinations up to 290 kilometers away with 600mm tactical ballistic missiles. The system is mounted on an 8×8 armored truck, which has the ability to fire the rockets within minutes of arriving at the target location.      

Hanwha’s bid was selected because it outperformed all other offers from US and European companies in terms of delivery time, range, and capacity to function in harsh weather conditions in Norway’s Arctic region. The agreement follows nearly ten years of defense cooperation between Norway and Hanwha, which began with Norway purchasing ammunition resupply vehicles and K9 VIDAR 155mm tracked self-propelled howitzers from Hanwha in 2017. 

As part of NATO’s capabilities in Northern Europe, the purchase of Chunmoo is a significant step in the expansion of Norway’s long-range fires and deterrence capabilities in the Arctic. In addition to its current and planned manufacturing lines, which include missile manufacture in Poland to supply the European defense industry, the acquisition marks a significant step in expanding Hanwha’s presence in the European defense market.

Russia Reinforcing Nuclear and Arctic Assets Near Finnish Border, Defence Minister Warns

In an interview with Euronews, Finland’s defence minister, Antti Häkkänen, expressed a sober and strategic warning about Russia’s expanding military posture near the Nordic country’s eastern frontier. According to Häkkänen, Moscow is not only strengthening its existing nuclear and strategic assets on the Kola Peninsula, a region of critical military importance, but also actively building new facilities right along the 1,340-kilometre land border with Finland.

For Helsinki, these developments are more than routine activity; they are a stark  reminder of the shifting security landscape in northern Europe. Historically neutral, Finland joined NATO in 2023, an alignment that has already extended the alliance’s reach deep into territories that Russia once viewed as a buffer. Häkkänen underscored the Arctic’s growing geopolitical significance, describing the region as “critical” for the security of Europe as a whole.

Put simply, Finland sees these Russian deployments not as an isolated spike in tension, but as part of a broader shaping of military power across its northern and eastern approaches. The construction of hardened facilities, enhanced nuclear infrastructure, and other strategic assets points to a long-term shift in Moscow’s defence priorities, one that aligns with its broader ambitions in the Arctic and beyond. 

Häkkänen didn’t frame this build-up as an immediate threat of invasion, but rather as a reminder of why preparedness and cooperation with NATO allies remain essential. He stressed that Europe’s ongoing debate about strengthening its own nuclear deterrence, whether through joint European capabilities or reinforced transatlantic partnerships, must continue. However, he was equally clear that such talk cannot replace the collective defence umbrella that NATO currently provides.

In essence, the message from Helsinki is clear, in an era of unpredictable geopolitics, northern Europe cannot take stability for granted. 

Industry updates

FCAS Programme Continues in Jeopardy 

Europe’s ambitious Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a €100bn plus programme to jointly develop a sixth-generation New Generation Fighter (NGF) alongside allied drone systems and a shared “combat cloud”,  has seen its core fighter-jet element drift toward collapse amid deep industrial and political disputes. Originally launched in 2017 by Emmanuel Macron and then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel as a trilateral effort with Spain, the project is now widely described as all but dead by officials and industry sources, with negotiations between France’s Dassault Aviation and Airbus’s defence arm stalled and key decisions on workshare, leadership, and technology rights unresolved. Politico reported that European officials see formal abandonment as more likely than a relaunch, even as French lawmakers and government figures publicly resist declaring an official end to the programme. 

Part of the collapse stems from divergent national requirements; France wants an aircraft capable of nuclear delivery and carrier operations, which Germany does not, and disagreements over industrial control and intellectual property. Airbus has floated a “two-fighter solution” in which separate jets might be developed under an otherwise cooperative FCAS umbrella, as a way to salvage parts of the programme; its leadership has also said it is prepared for scenarios where cooperation breaks down, and partners pursue independent designs. Several German industrial bodies and unions have urged Berlin to pull back entirely from the shared fighter element. Alongside these dynamics, political commentary from figures such as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has signalled skepticism about the value of a jointly developed NGF for Germany’s defence needs. 

Part of the collapse stems from divergent national requirements; France wants an aircraft capable of nuclear delivery and carrier operations, which Germany does not, and disagreements over industrial control and intellectual property. Airbus has floated a “two-fighter solution” in which separate jets might be developed under an otherwise cooperative FCAS umbrella, as a way to salvage parts of the programme; its leadership has also said it is prepared for scenarios where cooperation breaks down, and partners pursue independent designs. Several German industrial bodies and unions have urged Berlin to pull back entirely from the shared fighter element. Alongside these dynamics, political commentary from figures such as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has signalled skepticism about the value of a jointly developed NGF for Germany’s defence needs. 

Additional reporting through late February 2026 reinforces that the fighter is the programme’s most troubled pillar: industry sources at the Munich Security Conference suggested that without signed Phase 2 contracts to build demonstrators, the NGF may not survive, even if other parts of FCAS, such as drone “remote carriers” or combat cloud systems, continue in some form. Analysts argue this fracture exposes broader challenges in European defence cooperation, potentially pushing partners toward alternative programmes (like the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Programme) or separate national solutions if FCAS does not reach consensus. 

Italy Defence Minister Slams British Secrecy on GCAP 

Italy’s Defence Minister Crosetto has complained about the UK’s alleged secrecy concerning the GCAP fighter jet, a common project developed by UK, Italy and Japan. It is not the first time that Crosetto has criticised the UK’s alleged reluctance to share tech-related information with its partners highlighting the risk of benefiting its enemies : “It’s a huge favor to the Russians and the Chinese,” has claimed to Defence News. 

“Madness”. That is how Crosetto had been expressing its feelings towards the alleged UK’s actions while he made sure to point out his efforts to setting  the example by forcing Leonardo, the main Italian industry participating in the project, to give up secrecy and sharing intelligence and updates on the GCAP. Regardless, according to Defence News, the Italian and Japanese prime ministers had both expressed satisfaction concerning the GCAP updates in a recent meeting in February 2026.

France’s Macron Eyes Fighter Jet Deal in India

India and France have pushed their defence relationship forward during French President Emmanuel Macron’s 17–19 February 2026 visit to India, even as key deals remain in advanced negotiations. The two countries elevated their ties to a Special Global Strategic Partnership, underscoring a shared focus on security, co-development and industrial cooperation.

At the core of recent developments is the planned expansion of India’s air combat fleet. New Delhi’s Defence Acquisition Council granted initial clearance to pursue the procurement of 114 additional Rafale multi-role fighter jets from France, alongside missiles and other systems, though the contract terms and localisation details are still being finalised through government-to-government negotiations. French officials described the proposed fighter order, including co-production in India, as a “new step forward” for bilateral defence cooperation, with discussions continuing on price, industrial participation and phased in-country production. 

During the visit, leaders jointly inaugurated an H125 helicopter final assembly line in India, set up by Airbus and Tata Advanced Systems, and announced a joint venture between Safran and Bharat Electronics to manufacture the AASM Hammer precision-guided munitions domestically. These initiatives align with India’s broader Make in India push to increase defence industrial capacity and reduce dependence on foreign imports.

Beyond procurement and manufacturing, India and France reaffirmed cooperation in traditional and emerging domains: regular bilateral exercises such as Varuna (naval) and Garuda (air force) continue to strengthen interoperability; defence space collaboration and joint research under a Defence Industrial Roadmap were highlighted; and both governments reiterated commitments to cybersecurity, counter-terrorism and a rules-based Indo-Pacific security architecture. 

The broader partnership reflects mutual interest in linking technology, industry and strategic autonomy. While certain contracts like the expanded Rafale order are still being finalised, the trajectory points toward deeper industrial integration and a more balanced security cooperation shaped around long-term co-production, technology transfer and shared capability development.

European Policies

EU Considers Second SAFE Loan

Launched in May 2025, the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program is part of the EU’s overall plan to accelerate joint defense procurement and address the need to increasingly rely on external sources of security, especially considering the geopolitical situation and the reliability of the US military to provide security to the European Union. 

Under the aforementioned program, the European Commission borrows money from the financial market and then lends it to the EU members to purchase priority equipment, including missiles, ground equipment, and air and missile defense systems.  

Nowadays, options to provide additional EU defense funding after the conclusion of the €150 billion SAFE loan program are under consideration by the European Union. Indeed, it has been reported that despite the fact that the SAFE program is still active, the European Commission believes that the program will be fully committed this spring, with more than the available funds requested by the EU members.  

The success of the SAFE initiative, which has received requests for a sum larger than the original €150 billion envelope, has encouraged Brussels to consider whether a follow-up instrument is required to maintain the impetus for further strengthening the European defense base. Initial talks have centered on the potential structures for a second round of concessionary loans or an enhanced credit mechanism aiming to further support joint procurement and defense production within the European Union.   

While it is still too early for a final decision on a potential follow-up instrument, Brussels is reportedly assessing both the implementation of the original SAFE instrument as well as the changing security environment. This is also mainly due to the fact that some of these plans involve spending less than was earlier allocated, it will be possible for the European Commission to have unspent funds that will be available for allocation.  

The final decision on a potential subsequent instrument is only likely to be made after a comprehensive evaluation of expenditures, demands, and strategies following the implementation of the original SAFE instrument. This shows the EU’s commitment to swiftly scale up local production of defense supplies and cut dependence on foreign sources in the face of Russia’s aggression and in pursuit of security in Europe. 

Other news

German Government Seeks to Calm Concerns Over US Investors’ Stake in Stark Defence 

The German government is seeking to calm lawmakers’ concerns over U.S. tech investor Peter Thiel’s minority stake in drone manufacturer Stark Defence, as Berlin considers a multibillion-euro procurement of combat drones from the firm. Some members of parliament have questioned whether foreign investment in a sensitive defense supplier could create security or political risks. German officials have pushed back, emphasizing that Thiel’s holding is limited, does not grant operational control or access to classified data, and complies with national security screening rules. The debate comes as Germany accelerates efforts to modernize its armed forces and expand drone capabilities amid heightened security pressures in Europe and commitments to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank.

Top European Powers Plot Low-Cost Air Defence 

Europe’s top five military spenders, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Poland, grouped as the E5, have agreed to collaborate on developing low-cost air-defense systems, including affordable interceptors, autonomous platforms and drones, drawing on battlefield lessons from the war in Ukraine and aim to fill growing capability gaps against missiles and drones. The initiative reflects a broader shift toward cost-efficient, scalable defence solutions and deeper industrial cooperation in Europe’s defence sector, as governments seek to boost collective security and reduce reliance on high-end, expensive systems.

Germany Looks to Increase Oversight on German Defence Expenditure 

Friedrich Merz has intensified calls for closer oversight of Germany’s expanding defence expenditures, arguing that a large portion of new procurement funding is being absorbed by established defence conglomerates rather than fostering broader technological competitiveness. In particular, policymakers are debating whether spending concentrated on firms like Rheinmetall AG may reinforce legacy platform production—such as armored vehicles and traditional munitions, while providing more limited stimulus to emerging defence innovation sectors. Supporters of greater scrutiny argue that Germany’s strategic security environment requires not only increased military capacity but also a more diversified industrial base capable of supporting long-term technological leadership.

At the same time, officials are exploring reforms designed to modernize defence procurement and strengthen ties between government buyers and high-technology startups. Proposed measures include increasing transparency in large contract awards, lowering barriers for smaller suppliers, and directing more funding toward research and development in areas such as AI-enabled defence systems, autonomous platforms, and advanced sensor networks. The initiative reflects broader European concerns about maintaining technological sovereignty while rapidly scaling capabilities needed to address evolving security threats, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the growing importance of low-cost, mass-deployable defence technologies.