NewsFeed – March 2026

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The NewsFeed is a press review with a summary of a selection of articles and events that occurred in the past weeks. Keep track!

Focus: Change in French Nuclear Doctrine?

On 2 March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a new “forward deterrence” nuclear doctrine. This marks the most significant update to French nuclear policy in decades. In his first major speech on nuclear deterrence since 2020, Macron signaled a willingness to expand France’s traditionally national nuclear strategy into a broader European framework, while stressing that sovereign control over its deployment would remain exclusively French. 

The new doctrine reflects growing anxiety in European capitals over Russia’s continued aggression, China’s strategic rise, and shifting U.S. Defense priorities. Macron positioned the doctrine as complementary to NATO’s nuclear mission, but its deeper political significance lies in opening a European channel to deterrence that until recently was considered taboo. France remains the only nuclear power within the European Union; the United Kingdom, outside the EU since Brexit, is the continent’s other Nuclear Weapon State (NWS).  

The proposal broadens France’s nuclear umbrella across Europe. Paris will open deterrence exercises to European allies and may deploy strategic assets, including air-based capabilities, across the continent. Conventional capabilities could be deployed alongside nuclear forces for signaling and crisis response. This would move French doctrine closer to escalation management while explicitly rejecting a return to tactical nuclear weapons. France will increase its nuclear warhead stockpile, currently estimated at 290 warheads, and has announced plans to launch L’invincible, a third-generation ballistic missile submarine, in 2036. Notably, France will no longer disclose the size of its nuclear arsenal, a strategic opaqueness that allies will need to factor into their own plans.  

Initial reactions have been broadly supportive. Eight European nations – Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark – have agreed to join these efforts, with Germany set to visit strategic sites and to participate in joint exercises later this year. Norway and Finland have expressed openness to further dialogue. Yet the doctrine’s ambitions outpace operational capacity. Consultation mechanisms, cost-sharing plans, and other operational aspects remain undefined. The 2027 French election could bring a new government unwilling to honor Macron’s commitments. The central question remains: does this constitute a genuine strategic shift, or is it sophisticated signaling? The answer will depend on whether binding frameworks follow, and whether Europe’s conventional capabilities can improve. 

External Military Operations & Cooperations

European Naval and Air Deployments Signal Escalation in Eastern Mediterranean Security Posture

European military activity in the Eastern Mediterranean intensified sharply in March as Greece and Spain deployed naval and air assets to Cyprus amid rising tensions linked to the ongoing Iran conflict. The moves follow a series of destabilizing incidents, including Iran-linked drone strikes targeting the UK’s RAF Akrotiri base, underscoring the island’s growing role as a frontline node in the spillover of Middle Eastern hostilities into Europe’s immediate periphery.

Greece responded rapidly by dispatching frigates and F-16 fighter jets to Cyprus, reinforcing both air and maritime defenses. The deployment reflects a shift toward countering asymmetric threats, particularly unmanned aerial systems, with Greek naval platforms and aircraft configured for air-defense and electronic warfare operations. Beyond bilateral defense commitments to Cyprus, Athens’ actions highlight its expanding role as a regional security provider, contributing to the protection of critical NATO and EU infrastructure on the island. The presence of allied bases in Cyprus, especially British facilities used for operations in the Middle East, has elevated the island’s strategic importance, turning it into a forward hub for defensive coordination.

In parallel, Spain deployed the Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate Cristóbal Colón alongside the replenishment vessel Cantabria, integrating its forces into a broader European naval presence in the region. Spanish assets joined a French-led carrier strike group centered on the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, contributing air-defense and escort capabilities while supporting sustained operations through logistical reinforcement. This deployment forms part of a wider multinational buildup that includes France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and other European partners, collectively working to secure maritime routes and protect key infrastructure.

Notably, Spain’s involvement reflects a nuanced political-military posture. While Madrid has expressed opposition to U.S.-led strikes on Iran and avoided direct participation in offensive operations, it has simultaneously upheld its commitments to European and NATO security frameworks. This dual-track approach, diplomatic restraint paired with operational contribution, illustrates emerging divergences within the alliance, as member states balance domestic political considerations with collective defense responsibilities.

Taken together, these deployments signal a broader transformation in Europe’s strategic posture. Cyprus is rapidly emerging as a central hub for regional security operations, while counter-drone capabilities and layered air defense are becoming critical priorities in response to evolving threat vectors. At the same time, the crisis is exposing increasing complexity within NATO and EU cohesion, as allies pursue differing strategies in addressing escalation with Iran.

As the situation continues to evolve, the Eastern Mediterranean is solidifying its position as a critical interface between European security and Middle Eastern conflict dynamics, with European actors taking on a more visible and proactive role in managing regional stability. 

International Relations

Between Neutrality and Dependency: Switzerland’s F-35 Dilemma

At the beginning of March, Switzerland announced a reduction in its procurement order of Lockheed Martin-made F-35A jets. Under the 2022 contract, Bern had committed to acquiring 36 aircraft for CHF 6 billion. By March 2026, however, inflation and tariff-related cost increases forced a revision. Rather than expanding the budget, the Federal Council chose to scale down the order.

The decision not to abandon the contract reflects a constraint more than a clear strategic choice. Without the F-35s—and with the current fleet of F/A-18s set to retire in the early 2030s—Switzerland risks a capability gap in airspace protection as early as 2032. Maintaining the deal with Washington is therefore less about alignment and more about necessity.

At the same time, Bern has attempted to find an alternative. The Federal Council tasked the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) with assessing a second long-range, ground-based air defence system, likely European-made. This suggests an effort to diversify and reduce reliance on US suppliers, at least partially.

Yet the broader political signal is inconsistent. On March 21, amid the Iran war, Switzerland halted US arms exports and closed its airspace to US flights linked to the conflict. However, just one day earlier, the government requested parliamentary approval for CHF 3.4 billion in additional defence spending, including CHF 394 million to cover increased costs in the F-35 programme.

This juxtaposition reveals a clear tension. Switzerland signals political distance from US military operations while continuing to anchor its defence posture in US technology. Domestic reactions reflect this ambiguity: the Social Democratic Party (SP) and the Greens (Grüne) have criticised the procurement and called for its cancellation, arguing it contradicts Switzerland’s neutrality.

What emerges is not a coherent strategic shift but a constrained balancing act. Switzerland avoids a full political alignment with Washington in conflict scenarios, yet remains structurally tied to US defence systems. This is a function of dependency as credible alternatives, particularly within Europe, remain limited in both capability and timeline.

In this sense, Switzerland’s position is defined less by strategy than by the boundaries of its available options.

Cyprus and NATO: Gradual Alignment Without Accession

Recent reporting by Kathimerini indicates that Cyprus is actively exploring pathways toward closer engagement with NATO, signalling a cautious but noteworthy shift in its foreign and security policy orientation. While full membership remains politically constrained, the current approach reflects a strategy of incremental alignment with Euro-Atlantic defence structures.

Rather than pursuing immediate accession, Cypriot authorities appear to be considering a phased model of cooperation. This could involve enhanced participation in NATO partnership frameworks, greater interoperability with Allied forces, and alignment with NATO standards in defence planning and capability development. Such steps would allow Cyprus to deepen its integration into Western security architectures without triggering the political barriers associated with formal membership.

The principal obstacle remains Turkey, a NATO member that has consistently opposed closer institutional ties between Cyprus and the Alliance. The unresolved division of the island continues to shape the geopolitical constraints within which Cyprus operates. As a result, any move toward NATO must be carefully calibrated to avoid exacerbating regional tensions.

At the same time, Cyprus’ strategic relevance has increased. Located at the intersection of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, the island has become an important node in discussions on energy security, maritime routes, and regional stability. This evolving geopolitical context has strengthened the rationale for closer cooperation with NATO, particularly in areas such as maritime security, crisis response, and the protection of critical infrastructure.

Cyprus’s approach reflects a broader trend in European security: the emergence of flexible models of integration that fall short of full membership but provide tangible security benefits. Similar dynamics can be observed in NATO’s partnerships with countries that seek alignment without accession, highlighting a shift toward more adaptable and politically feasible forms of cooperation.

In this context, Cyprus’ strategy can be understood as part of a wider recalibration of security policy in response to an increasingly volatile regional environment. While formal NATO membership remains unlikely in the short term, the pursuit of gradual alignment suggests that Cyprus is seeking to anchor itself more firmly within the Euro-Atlantic security framework. The long-term implications of this approach will depend on both regional political developments and the evolution of NATO’s partnership mechanisms.

Trump Gets Chilly Response From Allies Over Demand on Hormuz

The administration of the United States of America, under President Donald Trump is facing strong resistance from its key allies in Europe and Asia after it asked them to send warships to open the vital Strait of Hormuz, which is used for the flow of one-fifth of the world’s oil supplies. The waterway has come under disruption due to the ongoing conflict in Iran following military strikes by the US and Israel in the country earlier this year.

The US has, indeed, asked several countries, including France, Japan, South Korea, the UK, and China, to send warships to escort oil ships and remove mines laid by Iranian forces. However, these countries are being extremely cautious in responding to the US call due to concerns of further escalation of the conflict.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said that although Britain would be willing to work in partnership with other countries in developing a broader strategy to ensure maritime trade, it would not engage in offensive activities. On the same line, French President Emmanuel Macron also stated that France would never engage in military operations to reopen the waterway as long as combat operations are ongoing. Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also raised questions over the purpose of dispatching a few European ships when the US already has a significant presence in the area.

However, the decision not to engage in the conflict has not gone down well with Trump, who stated that the decision could affect the future of NATO. Speaking from the White House, Trump stated that the US might be forced to reassess its role in the alliance, as other countries are relying too heavily on American military might, despite the US providing the highest proportion of the alliance’s defense spending.

Other countries, including Spain and Italy, have also rejected deploying naval vessels, citing that doing so would be similar to being at war. However, other countries, including Japan and South Korea, claim that they are still considering the issue in line with their legal and political constraints.

Meanwhile, the conflict continues to destabilize the region as Iran has launched missile and drone attacks across the Middle East and threatened industries linked to the US, while Israel has expanded operations against Iranian targets and militant groups in Lebanon. 

On top of that, with oil prices rising and global energy supply at risk, there is pressure to reopen the strait, but there is still no clear international response.

Industry updates

Dutch MoD Selects F21 MK2 torpedoes over MK48 for future submarines

The Dutch Ministry of Defense has revealed that the Royal Netherlands Navy will be purchasing the French F21 Mk2 heavy torpedo for its upcoming Orka-class submarines, replacing the earlier plan of retaining the American-made Mk48 heavy torpedo that is currently being used by the existing Walrus-class submarines.

The decision to acquire the French torpedo for the new submarines was made after an assessment of the feasibility of replacing the existing American-made heavy torpedo on the Walrus-class submarines. This will also save costs and difficulties that may be incurred in adapting an older weapon system to a new submarine design.

The new torpedo for the submarines is the French-made F21 Mk2 heavy torpedo, which is also manufactured by the manufacturer of the new submarines. As a consequence, the shared source for the torpedo and the submarines is expected to ensure a smooth integration of the vessel’s combat systems and its main weapon.

Commissioned in 2019, the F21 Mk2 is a modern 533-mm heavyweight torpedo intended for use against submarines and surface ships in deep-sea and coastal warfare scenarios. The torpedo is also equipped with a fiber optic wire guidance system that offers better data transmission capabilities and resistance to electronic interference compared to the copper wire guidance of the Mk48 torpedo. Additionally, it is powered by an electric propulsion system and has a low acoustic signature, making it stealthier than the Mk48, capable of achieving speeds over 50 knots and a range of over 50 kilometers.

The new torpedo will be deployed by the Netherlands’ upcoming Orka-class submarines, a four-boat project valued at about €4 billion and commissioned in 2024. The submarines are based on the design of the Barracuda-class submarine project and are expected to be deployed starting in 2033. 

Spanish shipbuilder Navantia joins the offer list to modernise the Croatian navy

As part of a Croatian effort to modernise its navy through the Multi-role Corvette programme, Spanish shipbuilder Navantia proposes its Avante 2200/ALFA 3000 corvette in the form of industrial cooperation. The list of proposals includes offers from Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United States, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, Israel, Sweden, and the Republic of Korea.

The company has already signed letters of intent with ULJANIK Brodogradnja shipyard and NORTES BLUE, an engineering and defence services company. Navantia has the support of the Spanish government, as highlighted by the presentation event being hosted by the Ambassador to Spain, Jose Ramón García Hernandez. Logistics, crew training, and repair support are also part of the offer with support from the Spanish Navy.

The ships are expected to operate both in local waters and in more distant places as part of international missions, and to have good air defence and anti-submarine capabilities.

Germany’s €600 Billion Defense Push Reshapes Industry and Strategy

Germany’s €600 billion defense initiative under Chancellor Friedrich Merz is rapidly transforming both its military posture and industrial base. Initially driven by heightened security concerns following Russia’s war in Ukraine, the program has accelerated procurement and triggered a surge in demand across the defense sector, from traditional manufacturers to emerging tech firms specializing in AI, robotics, and counter-drone systems. Beyond rearmament, the policy is functioning as a broader industrial stimulus, with parts of Germany’s manufacturing base, including automotive suppliers, beginning to pivot toward defense production.

Strategically, the expansion reinforces Germany’s role as a central pillar of European security while supporting NATO objectives and deeper defense-industrial cooperation across the continent. At the same time, the scale of investment is reshaping capital flows and innovation priorities, positioning Germany as a key driver of Europe’s long-term defense capability. However, the rapid increase in spending has also raised questions around procurement efficiency and the balance between established contractors and newer, innovation-led firms, highlighting the challenges of scaling defense capacity at speed.

Navantia and Fincantieri Advance European Patrol Corvette Programme with Joint Venture Framework

Spain’s Navantia and Italy’s Fincantieri have taken a significant step forward in the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) programme by strengthening their cooperation through a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at establishing a joint venture to coordinate and execute the initiative. The EPC, developed under the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework and supported by the European Defence Fund, seeks to deliver a new class of modular, interoperable, and multi-mission corvettes designed for surveillance, maritime security, and limited combat roles. The programme involves a broad European industrial consortium spanning multiple shipyards and more than 40 companies across the continent, to standardise design while allowing customization for participating navies. 

The strengthened Navantia–Fincantieri arrangement marks a shift from earlier-stage industrial coordination toward deeper structural integration, positioning both companies at the centre of Europe’s future light surface combatant market. The EPC programme is increasingly viewed as a cornerstone of European naval industrial policy, aiming to enhance interoperability, reduce development fragmentation, and reinforce EU maritime autonomy. By formalising closer cooperation, the two shipbuilders are not only advancing the design and development phase but also laying the groundwork for potential export opportunities to third countries, reinforcing Europe’s ambition to build a more unified and competitive defence-industrial base.  

European policies

European Commission Unveils AGILE Programme

The European Commission has unveiled a new €115 million pilot initiative called AGILE, designed to dramatically speed up the development and deployment of disruptive defence technologies across Europe. The programme focuses on accelerating innovation cycles in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, drones, and other advanced systems, with a strong emphasis on supporting start-ups, scale-ups, and SMEs. AGILE is structured to bridge the gap between research and battlefield application, aiming to move from concept to deployment in a matter of months rather than years. 

The initiative introduces a highly accelerated funding model, with decisions expected within four months and delivery of usable capabilities to European armed forces within 1–3 years. It will support roughly 20–30 projects, offering up to full cost coverage and even allowing retroactive reimbursement for early-stage development expenses. The programme is part of a broader EU push to strengthen defence innovation capacity and improve responsiveness to rapidly evolving security threats, particularly in light of lessons learned from modern high-intensity conflicts such as Ukraine.  

EDIP Work Programme Released 

The European Commission has adopted a €1.5 billion work programme under the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), marking a major step in scaling up Europe’s defence industrial capacity and strengthening cooperation with Ukraine. The initiative is designed to accelerate joint development, procurement, and production of critical defence capabilities across EU Member States, while reinforcing supply chains and reducing strategic dependencies. The funding package is intended to support faster delivery of military capabilities in key domains such as air and missile defence, drones and counter-drone systems, cyber, artillery, and maritime security. 

The programme forms part of the EU’s broader “Readiness 2030” defence strategy, which seeks to build a more integrated European defence market and close critical capability gaps through coordinated investment and industrial alignment. It also emphasizes deeper integration of Ukrainian defence innovation into EU structures, reflecting the lessons of the ongoing war and Europe’s need for rapid capability scaling. By combining funding, regulatory simplification, and multinational capability coalitions, the EU aims to move toward a more unified defence industrial base capable of delivering systems at speed and scale comparable to emerging security threats.  

FCAS Dispute Update  

One of the latest developments regarding the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) concerns a dispute between France’s Dassault Aviation and Germany’s Airbus Defence and Space. 

The initial project, as a Spanish-French and German joint venture, born to replace Spanish and German Eurofighter and French Rafale jets with next-generation fighter jets, interlinked with a system of autonomous drones and an AI cloud, by 2040, might be halted due to coordination difficulties. 

The main issue registered is the tightening of the relationship between Germany’s Airbus Defence and Space and Germany’s Ministry of Defence, and hence Germany’s government. As reported by Euractiv, “On Thursday, the German aerospace industry and its employees protested at various sites across the country, urging Berlin to move ahead with developing a separate fighter jet instead of coordinating with France. Local government officials came out in support of the workforce.” 

According to some experts, while in the past Germany’s government officials have avoided associating themselves with the defence industry, in recent times, due to the latest geopolitical developments, such as the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that is changing. 

Overall, FCAS is becoming a test of how European governments and industries are cooperating on common defence projects. 

Croatian youth surprise with eagerness for compulsory military service 

Croatia reinstated compulsory military service after it scrapped it in 2008 – surprisingly, half of the first batch of 800 people did not even wait for the call-up, and around a tenth are women, who are under no service obligation according to the rules.

The share of conscientious objectors is also low, around 10%. They can instead serve for 4 months in civilian service, for half the €1100 received by the military recruits. According to the rules, there are no special bans on the use of mobile phones (except during training sessions), and training includes, besides the traditional elements, skills related to cyber and drone warfare. 

Fellow EU member Slovenia is expected to follow soon in reinstating compulsory military service, with Serbia planning the same and rattling feathers in the region.

Other news

EU-NATO States Shift Away from U.S. Arms Dependence

Recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, as reported by Defence News, highlights a gradual but notable shift in defence procurement patterns among European members of NATO. While the United States remains the dominant supplier of military equipment to Europe, its relative share of arms exports to European NATO countries has begun to decline.

This development reflects a broader trend toward diversification and, to a limited extent, the strengthening of Europe’s own defence industrial base. In recent years, European states have increased investments in domestic and intra-European defence production, driven both by political ambitions for “strategic autonomy” and by practical lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine. The need for resilient supply chains, rapid replenishment of military stocks, and reduced external dependency has become increasingly evident.

Despite this shift, the United States continues to play a central role in European defence procurement. High-demand systems—particularly advanced aircraft, missile defence systems, and interoperable NATO-standard equipment—remain largely reliant on U.S. technology. The trend therefore, signals recalibration rather than disengagement.

Importantly, procurement patterns vary across the Alliance. Eastern flank states continue to prioritise U.S. systems, reflecting both operational requirements and the political value of transatlantic ties. In contrast, other European countries are increasingly investing in regional defence cooperation, including joint procurement schemes and collaborative industrial projects.

At the EU level, policy initiatives aimed at strengthening the European defence technological and industrial base are beginning to influence national decision-making. While fragmentation persists, these efforts indicate a gradual move toward a more coordinated and self-sustaining European defence market.

Taken together, the emerging pattern reflects a model of “managed interdependence,” whereby European NATO members seek to reduce vulnerability without weakening the transatlantic alliance. The shift is incremental but strategically significant, pointing to a rebalancing of defence relationships within NATO.

France’s Next-Generation Aircraft Carrier Officially Named ‘France Libre’

On 18 March 2026, the French President Emmanuel Macron announced the name of the next-generation nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) as “France libre”. 

The reference to General Charles de Gaulle, who led the French resistance movement after 1940, when France was occupied by Nazi Germany, is clear and loud, and the President himself explained his choice of wording in his speech during a ceremony at a Naval Group site near Nantes.

The aircraft carrier, designated under the program PANG (Porte-Avions de Nouvelle Génération), was approved in December 2025 after more than five years of design development and led by MO Porte-Avions, a joint venture between Naval Group and Chantiers de l’Atlantique, and by TechnicAtome. Following the timeline, the construction should start in 2032, the sea trials in 2036, and it should be ready to enter service in 2036. It is expected to remain in service for 45 years. 

Concerning the economic impact, according to Naval News, over 90 % of the procurement is domestic, while mobilizing over 800 suppliers and up to 14,000 jobs, reaching an overall cost of € 10 bn. 

Concerning the main features, being 310 meters long and weighing 80,000 tonnes, it would be much larger than the current “Charles de Gaulle” currently in use since 2001. Moreover, it is designed to embark an air wing of approximately 30 combat aircraft. 

Finally, it would be equipped with the most advanced technology by adopting the U.S.-origin Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), supplied by the US General Atomics through a Foreign Military Sales agreement, allowing multiple aircraft to launch and land simultaneously. 

With all the features, its domestic production and its significant name, France Libre symbolises national strength, resistance and independence.  

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